Jerry Pournelle - The Strategy of Technology

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THE STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGY
by
Stefan T. Possony, Ph.D.; Jerry E. Pournelle, Ph.D. and
Francis X. Kane, Ph.D. (Col., USAF Ret.)
THE STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGY
by
Stefan T. Possony, Ph.D.; Jerry E. Pournelle, Ph.D. and
Francis X. Kane, Ph.D. (Col., USAF Ret.)
First Edition, Copyright © 1970, Stefan T. Possony and Jerry Pournelle. ISBN 0-8424-0015-X
Electronic Edition, Copyright © 1997, Jerry E. Pournelle
Electronic Edition, prepared by WebWrights
The PREFACES are on this page. Scroll down. Read those first, then See Contents
and chapters above. There is a short disquisition on this book written in January
1999 that may be useful.
You may think of this edition of this book as a form of shareware. If you find it
useful, please send two dollars – bills will do—to
J. E. Pournelle, STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGY
12358 Ventura Blvd.
Box 372
Studio City, California, 91604.
Enclose any comments you like. I’ll see that Dr. Possony’s widow gets his share.
"A gigantic technological race is in progress between interception and penetration and each time
capacity for interception makes progress it is answered by a new advance in capacity for
penetration. Thus a new form of strategy is developing in peacetime, a strategy of which the
phrase ‘arms race’ used prior to the old great conflicts is hardly more than a faint reflection.
There are no battles in this strategy; each side is merely trying to outdo in performance the
equipment of the other. It has been termed ‘logistic strategy’. Its tactics are industrial, technical,
and financial. It is a form of indirect attrition; instead of destroying enemy resources, its object is
to make them obsolete, thereby forcing on him an enormous expenditure….
A silent and apparently peaceful war is therefore in progress, but it could well be a war which of
itself could be decisive."
--General d’Armee Andre Beaufre
Preface to the Electronic Edition 1997
The quotation above opened the original edition of this book; it was clearly prophetic. The silent
and apparently peaceful war was decisive.
This book was originally written in 1968 to 1970, a time when the Cold War was real and the
outcome still very much in doubt; it will be recalled that Nixon’s Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, convinced that the Cold War was lost, hoped to negotiate détente and come to terms
with Soviet International communism; and it was widely assumed in 1975 that the United States
had been dealt a major defeat in Viet Nam.
In 1991, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Seventy Years War, we attempted
to edit this work into a form suitable for publication in an electronic medium. This was well
before the popularity of the world wide web, and before electronic publishing tools were readily
available.
The end of the Seventy Years War brought other problems. The senior author, Dr. Stefan
Possony, lived to see the victory which he had done so much to bring about, but died shortly
after the collapse of international communism. Dr. Kane and Dr. Pournelle were involved in the
development of the space program, and particularly the renewal of the X projects which had been
canceled by McNamara in the name of Arms Control (because they were so successful at
generating new military technology. New technology wasn’t wanted by those enamored of Arms
Control strategies.)
For those and other reasons, this book languished for six years with little or no work done.
A generation of students used this book, but a new generation can’t find it; the copies still in use
in the War College are Xeroxes, the book long being out of print. Meanwhile, new threats loom
on the horizon. The Seventy Years War is over; the Technological War continues relentlessly. It
is possible that this book is needed now more than ever.
Most of the examples in this book were chosen for their impact on thoughts about the Cold War
and the threat of Soviet communism. They are now historical rather than current, and a proper
revision of this book would use examples from current threats; alas we haven’t time to do that;
nor have we time to do a proper chapter on space and space weapons. You will find THOR and
SDI in these pages, but they aren’t given their proper emphasis. No matter. The principles in this
book remain as true today as when they were written; we find little that needs explaining, and
nothing that requires an apology.
Jerry Pournelle
Studio City, California 1997
Preface to the Electronic Edition 1991
When this book was originally published, the Cold War was very real. The United States was
winding down the agony of Viet Nam, and one heard calls for "one, two, three, many Viet
Nams" to bring the United States to her knees.
The threat of nuclear war was quite real, although it was not everywhere taken quite as seriously
as it should have been.
The Soviet Union was not seen as an evil empire, but as the representative of the wave of the
future.
The result was that the early portion of the book was devoted to convincing the readers that the
threat was real, and imparting an understanding of the nature of that threat. That was needed
then. It is less needed now; yet some of the early material also introduces the concepts of
strategic analysis and the technological war, and those concepts are vital to understanding the
principles we try to explain in this book.
A full rewrite of STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGY would go through and pare away those
portions written to respond to the threat of the 70's and would add new examples and analyses to
fit the threat of the 90's. Alas, we have not time to do this; our choices are a 'quick fix' or not to
publish for some years.
[That paragraph was itself written in 1991; what we did then was essentially nothing. It is clearly
time to get this published in electronic form, whatever else we do.]
STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGY was a textbook in the Service Academies for several years, and
off and on has been a textbook in the Air and National Defense War Colleges. We have reason to
believe that its arguments were useful in bringing about adoption of a high tech strategy for the
US Armed Forces. That such a strategy was adopted is self evident from the victory in Iraq and
the collapse of the Soviet Empire. How much was due to this book can be debated, but we can at
least claim that this book explains the principles of technological strategy.
Some day we will revise the examples. However, the principles haven't changed, and the rapid
changes in the Soviet Union as well as the Iraq victory can be explained as consequences of an
earlier victory in the 'silent and apparently peaceful conflict which may be decisive' which we
called The Technological War.
From time to time we have inserted comments made at times later than the first publication.
Those are marked with brackets and dated. We find we haven't had to do much revision of the
book, and none of the principles espoused needed changing. We have pointed up new examples
of the application of those principles.
Portions of this revised text have from time to time been published in different volumes of
THERE WILL BE WAR, an anthology series edited by Jerry Pournelle.
Contents
You may think of this edition of this book as a form of shareware. If you find it useful, please send two
dollars – bills will do—to
J. E. Pournelle, STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGY
12358 Ventura Blvd.
Box 372
Studio City, California, 91604.
Enclose any comments you like. I’ll see that Dr. Possony’s widow gets his share.
Chapter One - The Technological War
Definition of Technological Warfare
Foundations of the Technological War - Fundamentals of Technological Strategy
Dimensions of the Technological War
An Overview of the Nature of Technology
The Decisive War
The Elements of Strategy - What is Strategy?
The Principles of War
Strategy and Technology
1988
Chapter Two - An Overview of the Recent History of the Technological War
Organization of This Chapter
Soviet Technological Strategy
The U.S. Conduct of the Technological War
The 1950 Era
The Nuclear Powered Airplane
The ICBM
SLBM
The 1960 Era
Apollo
Military Aircraft
The 1970 Era
MIRV
SHUTTLE
The 1980 Era
B-1
SDI
The Present Assumptions Governing U.S. Conduct of the Technological War
The Abandonment of the Initiative
Surprise
Science Is No Substitute for Military Judgment
Systems Analysis and Military Decisions: The TFX (1970)
The Limits of Scientific Military Analysis
Other Fallacies
Technological Process
Centralized Decisions
Small Advantages
Symmetry of Motives
Overkill
Fear of Obsolescence
An Illustrative Case History: GPS NAVSTAR: The Revolution 25 Years in the Making
Dr. Kane's Notes on Chapter 2
Chapter Three -The Nature of the Technological Process
U.S. Policies and Technological Progress
Technology and the Economic Base
The Technological War General
Conclusion
Chapter Four - Strategic Analysis
Note to the Second Edition
The Creation of Technological Strategy
The Elements of Technological Strategy: An Overview
The Creation of Military Technology
Phase One
MIRV: An Historical Example
Phase Two
Phase Three
Leadership in Technological Warfare
Political Decision Makers
Budget
Strategists
Military Operations Specialists
Scientists
Engineering and Development
Procurement and Production
Nonmilitary Warfare
Systems Analysis
Strategic Analysis
Dr. Kane's Notes on Chapter 4
Chapter Five - Surprise
The Sneak Attack
Strategic Surprise
Tactical Surprise
Strategic Surprise through Operational Surprise
Technology and Surprise
Stratagems to Achieve Surprise
The Basic Purpose of Surprise
Historical Examples
Breakthroughs
Exploitation of Surprise
Conclusion
Chapter Six - Assured Survival
Introduction
Assured Destruction
Soviet Strategic Doctrine
Requirements of Assured Survival
The Case Against Active Defense
Discussion
The Case for a New Strategy
The Technology of Active Defense
The Nature of the Threat
Defense Problems
The ABM Problem
Boost Phase
Post-Boost
Midcourse
Reentry or Terminal Phase
Interception Possibilities
Passive Defense
Laser Weapon Systems
What Kind of Defense
Survival
Chapter Seven - The Nuclear Technology Race
Foreword: 1988
The Applications Effort
The Basic and Continuing Role: Deterring War
The Initiative
The Shape of Things To Come: The Baruch Plan
The Second Ploy: The Test Ban
The Test-ban Strategy
Another Strategic Failure
Yield-to-weight Ratio
Nuclear Strategy
History of the Nuclear Race
Nuclear Research Requirements
The Impediments to Nuclear Research
Conclusion
Dr. Kane's Notes on Chapter 7
Chapter Eight - What Kind of War Is This?
Classification of Conflicts
What Are Small Wars?
Political Correlation of the Forces
Correlation of Morale
Correlation of Economic Power
Correlation of Technological Power
Correlation of Military Power
The Spectrum of Small Wars
Insurrection
Rebellion
Coup D'Etat
Revolution
The Revolution
Escalation to Centralized War
The United States and the Future of Small Wars
U.S. and Small Wars
World Policeman?
Force Requirements for Small Wars
Small Wars and Escalation
Conclusion
Chapter Nine - The Prevention of War
Why Wars Are Not Fought
The Nature of Strategic Decisions
Offense and Defense
The Modern Strategic War
The Effect of Nuclear Weapons
Force Levels in the Nuclear Era
Security Through Arms Control
Security in the Modern Era
THOR: code name given to a long range kinetic kill missile system described by Possony and
Pournelle in 1978. One variant uses orbiting weapons. Another uses lofted weapons. The key in
all cases is high accuracy with low collateral damage. [Back]
SDI: the Strategic Defense Initiative came to existence following Ronald Reagan's 23 March
1983 speech on strategic defenses. Much of the concept for and the content of that speech was
drafted by the Citizen's Advisory Council on National Space Policy, J. E. Pournelle, Chairman.
The first Council report was incorporated into the Reagan Transition Team papers; Colonel Kane
served as the editor for the space and defense portion of those papers. Strategic Defenses are
covered in this book in the chapter on Assured Survival. [Back]
abailey@webwrights.com
http://www.webwrights.com
The Strategy of Technology
by Stefan T. Possony, Ph.D.;
Jerry E. Pournelle, Ph.D. and
Col. Francis X. Kane, Ph.D. (USAF Ret.)
© 1997 Jerry E. Pournelle
Chapter One
The Technological War
[Table of Contents]
THERE ARE at least two kinds of games. One should be called finite, the other infinite. A finite game is
played for the purpose of winning, an infinite game for the purpose of continuing the game. James P. Carse
Finite and Infinite Games
The United States is at war. Whether we consider this to be the Protracted Conflict initiated in
1917 by the Bolsheviks or something new brought about by the march of technology, the war
cannot be escaped. The field of engagement is not everywhere bloody. Except for financial
sacrifices, many citizens of the West and subjects of Communism may be unaware of the conflict
until the decisive moment, if it ever comes, is upon them. For all that, the dynamic Technological
War is most real, and we must understand its nature, for it is decisive. Our very survival depends
on our constantly winning this battle.
The Technological War has been raging since World War II. That war marked the end of the era
in which decisive military power grew exclusively from the products of the original Industrial
Revolution. In the new era, power grows largely -- sometimes exclusively -- from products based
on applied science.
The Technological War is dynamic. There are dramatic peaks in activities as rates of change
suddenly accelerate. The theater of operations can change in bewildering ways: recent (1989)
events in Europe are a prime example. Ruling classes come and go, alliances are made and
dissolved; but the Technological War remains. For the West, the Technological War is an infinite
game; victory in one battle, or in an entire theater of conflict, does not end the conflict.
The Technological War is seemingly impersonal because of its new and unexpected sources of
change and its global impact. Even so, the Technological War, like all conflicts, is driven by
human ingenuity responding to basic challenges and aspirations.
For many years the most basic challenge of the Technological War has been the threat to U.S.
security caused by the enmity of the Soviet Union, specifically a small group within the ruling
elite of the U.S.S.R. That group within the nomenklatura (Footnote 15) deliberately chose the
U.S. as its enemy after the close of World War II, and renewed the Protracted Conflict against
the rest of the world. That conflict has lasted for over seventy years.
摘要：

THESTRATEGYOFTECHNOLOGYbyStefanT.Possony,Ph.D.;JerryE.Pournelle,Ph.D.andFrancisX.Kane,Ph.D.(Col.,USAFRet.)THESTRATEGYOFTECHNOLOGYbyStefanT.Possony,Ph.D.;JerryE.Pournelle,Ph.D.andFrancisX.Kane,Ph.D.(Col.,USAFRet.)FirstEdition,Copyright©1970,StefanT.PossonyandJerryPournelle.ISBN0-8424-0015-XElectronic...

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