(ebook) Trotzky, Leon - From October to Brest-Litovsk

VIP免费

2024-11-29 0 0 143.3KB 48 页 5.9玖币

From October to Brest−Litovsk

Leon Trotzky

Table of Contents

From October to Brest−Litovsk........................................................................................................................1

Leon Trotzky............................................................................................................................................1

THE MIDDLE−CLASS INTELLECTUALS IN THE REVOLUTION................................................2

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BOLSHEVIKI...............................................................................4

THE DRIVE OF JUNE 18TH.................................................................................................................5

THE JULY DAYS...................................................................................................................................8

THE EVENTS FOLLOWING THE JULY DAYS...............................................................................10

THE CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIETS..............................................................................................11

THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE.................................................................................................13

INEVITABILITY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER.....................................................................14

THE CONFLICT REGARDING THE PETROGRAD GARRISON..................................................15

THE DEMOCRATIC SOVIET AND PRE−PARLIAMENT .........................................................17

THE S. R.'S AND MENSHEVIKS.......................................................................................................18

WITHDRAWING FROM THE PRE−PARLIAMENT. THE VOICE OF THE FRONT...................19

THE PETROGRAD SOVIET DAY .................................................................................................21

THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION.......................................................................................23

THE DECISIVE DAY...........................................................................................................................25

THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIES...............................26

THE FIRST DAYS OF THE NEW REGIME.......................................................................................27

THE CADET UPRISING OF OCTOBER 29TH..................................................................................28

KERENSKY'S ADVANCE ON PETROGRAD...................................................................................29

COLLAPSE OF KERENSKY'S ATTEMPT........................................................................................31

INTERNAL FRICTION........................................................................................................................34

THE FATE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY...........................................................................35

THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP..........................37

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS....................................................................................................................38

ADDRESS OF THE PEOPLES COMMISSAR ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS........................................40

THE SECOND WAR AND THE SIGNING OF PEACE....................................................................44

CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................................45

From October to Brest−Litovsk

Leon Trotzky

http://www.blackmask.com

• THE MIDDLE−CLASS INTELLECTUALS IN THE REVOLUTION

• THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BOLSHEVIKI

• THE DRIVE OF JUNE 18TH

• THE JULY DAYS

• THE EVENTS FOLLOWING THE JULY DAYS

• THE CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIETS

• THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE

• INEVITABILITY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

• THE CONFLICT REGARDING THE PETROGRAD GARRISON

• THE DEMOCRATIC SOVIET AND PRE−PARLIAMENT

• THE S. R.'S AND MENSHEVIKS

• WITHDRAWING FROM THE PRE−PARLIAMENT. THE VOICE OF THE FRONT

• THE PETROGRAD SOVIET DAY

• THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION

• THE DECISIVE DAY

• THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIES

• THE FIRST DAYS OF THE NEW REGIME

• THE CADET UPRISING OF OCTOBER 29TH

• KERENSKY'S ADVANCE ON PETROGRAD

• COLLAPSE OF KERENSKY'S ATTEMPT

• INTERNAL FRICTION

• THE FATE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

• THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

• PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

• ADDRESS OF THE PEOPLES COMMISSAR ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

• THE SECOND WAR AND THE SIGNING OF PEACE

• CONCLUSION

Produced by Julie Barkley, David Starner

and the Online Proofreading Team.

Authorized Translation from the Russian

1919

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES:

1. In this book Trotzky (until near the end) uses the Russian Calendar in indicating dates, which, as the reader

will recall, is 13 days behind the Gregorian Calendar, now introduced in Russia.

2. The abbreviation S. R. and S. R.'s is often used for Social−Revolutionist(s) or

From October to Brest−Litovsk 1

Socialist−Revolutionaries.

3. Maximalist often appears instead of bolshevik, and minimalist instead of menshevik.

THE MIDDLE−CLASS INTELLECTUALS IN THE REVOLUTION

Events move so quickly at this time, that it is hard to set them down from memory even in chronological

sequence. Neither newspapers nor documents are at our disposal. And vet the repeated interruptions in the

Brest−Litovsk negotiations create a suspense which, under present circumstances, is no longer bearable. I

shall endeavor, therefore, to recall the course and the landmarks of the October revolution, reserving the right

to complete and correct this exposition subsequently in the light of documents.

What characterized our party almost from the very first period of the revolution, was the conviction that it

would ultimately come into power through the logic of events. I do not refer to the theorists of the party, who,

many years before the revolutioneven before the revolution of 1905as a result of their analysis of class

relations in Russia, came to the conclusion that the triumphant development of the revolution must inevitably

transfer the power to the proletariat, supported by the vast masses of the poorest peasants. The chief basis of

this prognosis was the insignificance of the Russian bourgeois democracy and the concentrated character of

Russian industrialismwhich makes of the Russian proletariat a factor of tremendous social importance. The

insignificance of bourgeois democracy is but the complement of the power and significance of the proletariat.

It is true, the war has deceived many on this point, and, first of all, the leading groups of bourgeois

democracy themselves. The war has assigned a decisive role in the events of the revolution to the army. The

old army meant the peasantry. Had the revolution developed more normallythat is, under peaceful

circumstances, as it had in 1912the proletariat would always have held a dominant position, while the

peasant masses would gradually have been taken in tow by the proletariat and drawn into the whirlpool of the

revolution.

But the war produced an altogether different succession of events. The army welded the peasants together,

not by a political, but by a military tie. Before the peasant masses could be drawn together by revolutionary

demands and ideas, they were already organized in regimental staffs, divisions and army corps. The

representatives of petty bourgeois democracy, scattered through this army and playing a leading role in it,

both in a military and in a conceptual way, were almost completely permeated with middle−class

revolutionary tendencies. The deep social discontent in the masses became more acute and was bound to

manifest itself, particularly because of the military shipwreck of Czarism. The proletariat, as represented in

its advanced ranks, began, as soon as the revolution developed, to revive the 1905 tradition and called upon

the masses of the people to organize in the form of representative bodiessoviets, consisting of deputies. The

army was called upon to send its representatives to the revolutionary organizations before its political

conscience caught up in any way with the rapid course of the revolution. Whom could the soldiers send as

deputies? Eventually, those representatives of the intellectuals and semi−intellectuals who chanced to be

among them and who possessed the least bit of knowledge of political affairs and could make this knowledge

articulate. In this way, the petty bourgeois intellectuals were at once and of necessity raised to great

prominence in the awakening army. Doctors, engineers, lawyers, journalists and volunteers, who under

pre−bellum conditions led a rather retired life and made no claim to any importance, suddenly found

themselves representative of whole corps and armies and felt that they were leaders of the revolution. The

nebulousness of their political ideology fully corresponded with the formlessness of the revolutionary

consciousness of the masses. These elements were extremely condescending toward us Sectarians, for we

expressed the social demands of the workers and the peasants most pointedly and uncompromisingly.

At the same time, the petty bourgeois democracy, with the arrogance of revolutionary upstarts, harbored the

deepest mistrust of itself and of the very masses who had raised it to such unexpected heights. Calling

themselves Socialists, and considering themselves such, the intellectuals were filled with an ill−disguised

From October to Brest−Litovsk

THE MIDDLE−CLASS INTELLECTUALS IN THE REVOLUTION 2

respect for the political power of the liberal bourgeoisie, towards their knowledge and methods. To this was

due the effort of the petty bourgeois leaders to secure, at any cost, a cooperation, union, or coalition with the

liberal bourgeoisie. The programme of the Social−Revolutionistscreated wholly out of nebulous

humanitarian formulas, substituting sentimental generalizations and moralistic superstructures for a

class−conscious attitude, proved to be the thing best adapted for a spiritual vestment of this type of leaders.

Their efforts in one way or another to prop up their spiritual and political helplessness by the science and

politics of the bourgeoisie which so overawed them, found its theoretical justification in the teachings of the

Mensheviki, who explained that the present revolution was a bourgeois revolution, and therefore could not

succeed without the participation of the bourgeoisie in the government. In this way, the natural bloc of

Social−Revolutionists and Mensheviki was created, which gave simultaneous expression to the political

lukewarmness of the middle−class intellectuals and its relation of vassal to imperialistic liberalism.

It was perfectly clear to us that the logic of the class struggle would, sooner or later, destroy this temporary

combination and cast aside the leaders of the transition period. The hegemony of the petty bourgeois

intellectuals meant, in reality, that the peasantry, which had suddenly been called, through the agency of the

military machine, to an organized participation in political life, had, by mere weight of numbers,

overshadowed the working class and temporarily dislodged it. More than this: To the extent that the

middle−class leaders had suddenly been lifted to terrific heights by the mere bulk of the army, the proletariat

itself, and its advanced minority, had been discounted, and could not but acquire a certain political respect for

them and a desire to preserve a political bond with them; it might otherwise be in danger of losing contact

with the peasantry. In the memories of the older generation of workingmen, the lesson of 1905 was firmly

fixed; then, the proletariat was defeated just because the heavy peasant reserves did not arrive in time for the

decisive battle. This is why in this first period of the revolution even the masses of workingmen proved so

much more receptive to the political ideology of the Social−Revolutionists and the Mensheviki. All the more

so, since the revolution had awakened the hitherto dormant and backward proletarian masses, thus making

uninformed intellectual radicalism into a preparatory school for them.

The Soviets of Workingmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies meant, under these circumstances, the

domination of peasant formlessness over proletarian socialism, and the domination of intellectual radicalism

over peasant formlessness. The soviet institution rose so rapidly, and to such prominence, largely because the

intellectuals, with their technical knowledge and bourgeois connections, played a leading part in the work of

the soviet. It was clear to us, however, that the whole inspiring structure was based upon the deepest inner

contradictions, and that its downfall during the next phase of the revolution was quite inevitable.

The revolution grew directly out of the war, and the war became the great test for all parties and

revolutionary forces. The intellectual leaders were against the war. Many of them, under the Czarist

regime, had considered themselves partisans of the left wing of the Internationale, and subscribed to the

Zimmerwald resolution. But everything changed suddenly when they found themselves in responsible

posts. To adhere to the policy of Revolutionary Socialism meant, under those circumstances, to break with

the bourgeoisie, their own and that of the Allies. And we have already said that the political helplessness of

the intellectual and semi−intellectual middle class sought shelter for itself in a union with bourgeois

liberalism. This caused the pitiful and truly shameful attitude of the middle−class leaders towards the war.

They confined themselves to sighs, phrases, secret exhortations or appeals addressed to the Allied

Governments, while they were actually following the same path as the liberal bourgeoisie. The masses of

soldiers in the trenches could not, of course, reach the conclusion that the war, in which they had participated

for nearly three years, had changed its character merely because certain new persons, who called themselves

Social−Revolutionists or Mensheviki, were taking part in the Petrograd Government. Milyukov

displaced the bureaucrat Pokrovsky; Tereshtchenko displaced Milyukovwhich means that bureaucratic

treachery had been replaced first by militant Cadet imperialism, then by an unprincipled, nebulous and

political subserviency; but it brought no objective changes, and indicated no way out of the terrible war.

From October to Brest−Litovsk

THE MIDDLE−CLASS INTELLECTUALS IN THE REVOLUTION 3

Just in this lies the primary cause of the subsequent disorganization of the army. The agitators told the

soldiers that the Czarist Government had sent them into slaughter without any rime or reason. But those who

replaced the Czar could not in the least change the character of the war, just as they could not find their way

clear for a peace campaign. The first months were spent in merely marking time. This tried the patience both

of the army and of the Allied Governments, and prompted the drive of June 18, which was demanded by the

Allies, who insisted upon the fulfillment of the old Czarist obligations. Scared by their own helplessness and

by the growing impatience of the masses, the leaders of the middle class complied with this demand. They

actually began to think that, in order to obtain peace, it was only necessary for the Russian army to make a

drive. Such a drive seemed to offer a way out of the difficult situation, a real solution of the

problemsalvation. It is hard to imagine a more amazing and more criminal delusion. They spoke of the drive

in those days in the same terms that were used by the social−patriots of all countries in the first days and

weeks of the war, when speaking of the necessity of supporting the cause of national defence, of

strengthening the holy alliance of nations, etc., etc. All their Zimmerwald internationalistic infatuations had

vanished as if by magic.

To us, who were in uncompromising opposition, it was clear that the drive was beset with terrible danger,

threatening perhaps the ruin of the revolution itself. We sounded the warning that the army, which had been

awakened and deeply stirred by the tumultuous events which it was still far from comprehending, could not

be sent into battle without giving it new ideas which it could recognize as its own. We warned, accused,

threatened. But as for the dominant party, tied up as it was with the Allied bourgeoisie, there was no other

course; we were naturally threatened with enmity, with bitter hatred.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BOLSHEVIKI

The future historian will look over the pages of the Russian newspapers for May and June with considerable

emotion, for it was then that the agitation for the drive was being carried on. Almost every article, without

exception, in all the governmental and official newspapers, was directed against the Bolsheviki. There was

not an accusation, not a libel, that was not brought up against us in those days. The leading role in the

campaign was played, of course, by the Cadet bourgeoisie, who were prompted by their class instincts to the

knowledge that it was not only a question of a drive, but also of all the further developments of the

revolution, and primarily of the fate of government control. The bourgeoisie's machinery of public opinion"

revealed itself here in all its power. All the organs, organizations, publications, tribunes and pulpits were

pressed into the service of a single common idea: to make the Bolsheviki impossible as a political party. The

concerted effort and the dramatic newspaper campaign against the Bolsheviki already foreshadowed the civil

war which was to develop during the next stage of the revolution.

The purpose of the bitterness of this agitation and libel was to create a total estrangement and irrepressible

enmity between the laboring masses, on the one hand, and the educated elements on the other. The liberal

bourgeoisie understood that it could not subdue the masses without the aid and intercession of the

middle−class democracy, which, as we have already pointed out, proved to be temporarily the leader of the

revolutionary organizations. Therefore, the immediate object of the political baiting of the Bolsheviki was to

raise irreconcilable enmity between our party and the vast masses of the socialistic intellectuals, who, if

they were alienated from the proletariat, could not but come under the sway of the liberal bourgeoisie.

During the first All−Russian Council of Soviets came the first alarming peal of thunder, foretelling the

terrible events that were coming. The party designated the 10th of June as the day for an armed demonstration

at Petrograd. Its immediate purpose was to influence the All−Russian Council of Soviets. Take the power

into your own handsis what the Petrograd workingman wanted to say plainly to the Social−Revolutionists

and the Mensheviki. Sever relations with the bourgeoisie, give up the idea of coalition, and take the power

into your own hands. To us it was clear that the break between the Social−Revolutionists and the

Mensheviki on the one hand, and the liberal bourgeoisie on the other, would compel the former to seek the

From October to Brest−Litovsk

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BOLSHEVIKI 4

support of the more determined, advanced organization of the proletariat, which would thus be assured of

playing a leading role. And this is exactly what frightened the middle−class leaders. Together with the

Government, in which they had their representatives, and hand in hand with the liberal and

counter−revolutionary bourgeoisie, they began a furious and insane campaign against the proposed

demonstration, as soon as they heard of it. All their forces were marshalled against us. We had an

insignificant minority in the Council and withdrew. The demonstration did not take place.

But this frustrated demonstration left the deepest bitterness in the minds of the two opposing forces, widened

the breach and intensified their hatred. At a secret conference of the Executive Committee of the Council, in

which representatives of the minority participated, Tseretelli, then minister of the coalition government, with

all the arrogance of a narrow−minded middle−class doctrinaire, said that the only danger threatening the

revolution was the Bolsheviki and the Petrograd proletariat armed by them. From this he concluded that it

was necessary to disarm the people, who did not know how to handle fire−arms. This referred to the

workingmen and to those parts of the Petrograd garrison who were with our party. However, the disarming

did not take place. For such a sharp measure the political and psychological conditions were not yet quite ripe.

To afford the masses some compensation for the demonstration they had missed, the Council of Soviets

called a general unarmed demonstration for the 18th of June. But it was just this very day that marked the

political triumph of our party. The masses poured into the streets in mighty columns; and, despite the fact that

they were called out by the official Soviet organization, to counteract our intended demonstration of the 10th

of June, the workingmen and soldiers had inscribed on their banners and placards the slogans of our party:

Down with secret treaties, Down with political drives, Long live a just peace! Down with the ten

capitalistic ministers, and All power to the Soviets. Of placards expressing confidence in the coalition

government there were but three one from a cossack regiment, another from the Plekhanov group, and the

third from the Petrograd organization of the Bund, composed mostly of non−proletarian elements. This

demonstration showed not only to our enemies, but also to ourselves as well that we were much stronger in

Petrograd than was generally supposed.

THE DRIVE OF JUNE 18TH

A governmental crisis, as a result of the demonstration by these revolutionary bodies, appeared absolutely

inevitable. But the impression produced by the demonstration was lost as soon as it was reported from the

front that the revolutionary army had advanced to attack the enemy. On the very day that the workingmen and

the Petrograd garrison demanded the publication of the secret treaties and an open offer of peace, Kerensky

flung the revolutionary troops into battle. This was no mere coincidence, to be sure. The projectors had

everything prepared in advance, and the time of attack was determined not by military but by political

considerations.

On the 19th of June, there was a so−called patriotic demonstration in the streets of Petrograd. The Nevsky

Prospect, the chief artery of the bourgeoisie, was studded with excited groups, in which army officers,

journalists and well−dressed ladies were carrying on a bitter campaign against the Bolsheviki. The first

reports of the military drive were favorable. The leading liberal papers considered that the principal aim had

been attained, that the drive of June 18, regardless of its ultimate military results, would deal a mortal blow to

the revolution, restore the army's former discipline, and assure the liberal bourgeoisie of a commanding

position in the affairs of the government.

We, however, indicated to the bourgeoisie a different line of future events. In a special declaration which we

made in the Soviet Council a few days before the drive, we declared that the military advance would

inevitably destroy all the internal ties within the army, set up its various parts one against the other and turn

the scales heavily in favor of the counter−revolutionary elements, since it would be impossible to maintain

discipline in a demoralized armyan army devoid of controlling ideaswithout recourse to severe repressive

From October to Brest−Litovsk

THE DRIVE OF JUNE 18TH 5

measures. In other words, we foretold in this declaration those results which later came to be known

collectively under the name of Kornilovism. We believed that the greatest danger threatened the revolution

in either casewhether the drive proved successful, which we did not expect, or met with failure, which

seemed to us almost inevitable. A successful military advance would have united the middle class and the

bourgeoisie in their common chauvinistic tendencies, thus isolating the revolutionary proletariat. An

unsuccessful drive was likely to demoralize the army completely, to involve a general retreat and the loss of

much additional territory, and to bring disgust and disappointment to the people. Events took the latter

course. The news of victory did not last long. It was soon replaced by gloomy reports of the refusal of many

regiments to support the advancing columns, of the great losses in commanding officers, who sometimes

composed the whole of the attacking units, etc. In view of its great historical significance, we append an

extract from the document issued by our party in the All−Russian Council of Soviets on the 3rd of June,

1917, just two weeks before the drive.

* * * * *

We deem it necessary to present, as the first order of the day, a question on whose solution depend not only

all the other measures to be adopted by the Council, but actually and literally the fate of the whole Russian

revolution the question of the military drive which is being planned for the immediate future.

Having put the people and the army, which does not know in the name of what international ends it is called

upon to shed its blood, face to face with the impending attack (with all its consequences), the

counter−revolutionary circles of Russia are counting on the fact that this drive will necessitate a

concentration of power in the hands of the military, diplomatic, and capitalistic groups affiliated with

English, French and American imperialism, and thus free them from the necessity of reckoning later with the

organized will of Russian democracy.

The secret counter−revolutionary instigators of the drive, who do not stop short even of military

adventurism, are consciously trying to play on the demoralization in the army, brought about by the internal

and international situation of the country, and to this end are inspiring the discouraged elements with the

fallacious idea that the very fact of a drive can rehabilitate the armyand by this mechanical means hide the

lack of a definite program for liquidating the war. At the same time, it is clear that such an advance cannot

but completely disorganize the army by setting up its various units one against the other.

* * * * *

The military events were developing amid ever increasing difficulties in the internal life of the nation. With

regard to the land question, industrial life, and national relations, the coalition government did not take a

single resolute step forward. The food and transportation situations were becoming more and more

disorganized. Local clashes were growing more frequent. The Socialistic ministers were exhorting the

masses to be patient. All decisions and measures, including the calling of the Constituent Assembly, were

being postponed. The insolvency and the instability of the coalition regime were obvious.

There were two possible ways out: to drive the bourgeoisie out of power and promote the aims of the

revolution, or to adopt the policy of bridling the people by resorting to repressive measures. Kerensky and

Tseretelli clung to a middle course and only muddled matters the more. When the Cadets, the wiser and more

far−sighted leaders of the coalition government, understood that the unsuccessful military advance of June

18th might deal a blow not only to the revolution, but also to the government temporarily, they threw the

whole weight of responsibility upon their allies to the left.

On the 2nd of July came a crisis in the ministry, the immediate cause of which was the Ukrainian question.

From October to Brest−Litovsk

THE DRIVE OF JUNE 18TH 6

This was in every respect a period of most intense political suspense. From various points at the front came

delegates and private individuals, telling of the chaos which reigned in the army as a result of the advance.

The so−called government press demanded severe repressions. Such demands frequently came from the

so−called Socialistic papers, also Kerensky, more and more openly, went over to the side of the Cadets and

the Cadet generals, who had manifested not only their hatred of revolution, but also their bitter enmity toward

revolutionary parties in general. The allied ambassadors were pressing the government with the demand that

army discipline be restored and the advance continued. The greatest panic prevailed in government circles,

while among the workingmen much discontent had accumulated, which craved for outward expression.

Avail yourselves of the resignations of the Cadet ministers and take all the power into your own hands!

was the call addressed by the workingmen of Petrograd to the Socialist−Revolutionists and Mensheviki in

control of the Soviet parties.

I recall the session of the Executive Committee which was held on the 2nd of July. The Soviet ministers came

to report a new crisis in the government. We were intensely interested to learn what position they would take

now that they had actually gone to pieces under the great ordeals arising from coalition policies. Their

spokesman was Tseretelli. He nonchalantly explained to the Executive Committee that those concessions

which he and Tereshchenko had made to the Kiev Rada did not by any means signify a dismemberment of

the country, and that this, therefore, did not give the Cadets any good reason for leaving the Ministry.

Tseretelli accused the Cadet leaders of practising a centralistic doctrinairism, of failing to understand the

necessity for compromising with the Ukrainians, etc., etc. The total impression was pitiful in the extreme: the

hopeless doctrinaire of the coalition government was hurling the charge of doctrinairism against the crafty

capitalist politicians who seized upon the first suitable excuse for compelling their political clerks to repent of

the decisive turn they had given to the course of events by the military advance of June 18th.

After all the preceding experience of the coalition, there would seem to be but one way out of the

difficultyto break with the Cadets and set up a Soviet government. The relative forces within the Soviets

were such at the time that the Soviet's power as a political party would fall naturally into the hands of the

Social−Revolutionists and the Mensheviki. We deliberately faced the situation. Thanks to the possibility of

reelections at any time, the mechanism of the Soviets assured a sufficiently exact reflection of the progressive

shift toward the left in the masses of workers and soldiers. After the break of the coalition with the

bourgeoisie, the radical tendencies should, we expected, receive a greater following in the Soviet

organizations. Under such circumstances, the proletariat's struggle for power would naturally move in the

channel of Soviet organizations and could take a more normal course. Having broken with the bourgeoisie,

the middle−class democracy would itself fall under their ban and would be compelled to seek a closer union

with the Socialistic proletariat. In this way the indecisiveness and political indefiniteness of the middle−class

democratic elements would be overcome sooner or later by the working masses, with the help of our

criticism. This is the reason why we demanded that the leading Soviet parties, in which we had no real

confidence (and we frankly said so), should take the governing power into their own hands.

But even after the ministerial crisis of the 2nd of July, Tseretelli and his adherents did not abandon the

coalition idea. They explained in the Executive Committee that the leading Cadets were, indeed, demoralized

by doctrinairism and even by counter−revolutionism, but that in the provinces there were still many

bourgeois elements which could still go hand in hand with the revolutionary democrats, and that in order to

make sure of their co−operation it was necessary to attract representatives of the bourgeoisie into the

membership of the new ministry. Dan already entertained hopes of a radical−democratic party to be hastily

built up, at the time, by a few pro−democratic politicians. The report that the coalition government had been

broken up, only to be replaced by a new coalition, spread rapidly through Petrograd and provoked a storm of

indignation among the workingmen and soldiers everywhere. Thus the events of July 3rd−5th were produced.

From October to Brest−Litovsk

THE DRIVE OF JUNE 18TH 7

THE JULY DAYS

Already during the session of the Executive Committee we were informed by telephone that a regiment of

machine−gunners was making ready for attack. By telephone, too, we adopted measures to check these

preparations, but the ferment was working among the people. Representatives of military units that had been

disciplined for insubordination brought alarming news from the front, of repressions which aroused the

garrison. Among the Petrograd workingmen the displeasure with the official leaders was intensified also by

the fact that Tseretelli, Dan and Cheidze misrepresented the general views of the proletariat in their endeavor

to prevent the Petrograd Soviet from becoming the mouthpiece of the new tendencies of the toilers. The

All−Russian Executive Committee, formed in the July Council and depending upon the more backward

provinces, put the Petrograd Soviet more and more into the background and took all matters into its own

hands, including even local Petrograd affairs.

A clash was inevitable. The workers and soldiers pressed from below, vehemently voiced their discontent

with the official Soviet policies and demanded greater resolution from our party. We considered that, in view

of the backwardness of the provinces, the time for such a course had not yet arrived. At the same time, we

feared that the events taking place at the front might bring extreme chaos into the revolutionary ranks, and

desperation to the hearts of the people. The attitude of our party toward the movement of July 3rd−5th was

quite well defined. On the one hand, there was the danger that Petrograd might break away from the more

backward parts of the country; while on the other, there was the feeling that only the active and energetic

intervention of Petrograd could save the day. The party agitators who worked among the people were

working in harmony with the masses, conducting an uncompromising campaign.

There was still some hope that the demonstration of the revolutionary masses in the streets might destroy the

blind doctrinairism of the coalitionists and make them understand that they could retain their power only by

breaking openly with the bourgeoisie. Despite all that had recently been said and written in the bourgeois

press, our party had no intention whatever of seizing power by means of an armed revolt. In point of fact, the

revolutionary demonstration started spontaneously, and was guided by us only in a political way.

The Central Executive Committee was holding its session in the Taurida Palace, when turbulent crowds of

armed soldiers and workmen surrounded it from all sides. Among them was, of course, an insignificant

number of anarchistic elements, which were ready to use their arms against the Soviet center. There were also

some pogrom" elements, black−hundred elements, and obviously mercenary elements, seeking to utilize the

occasion for instigating pogroms and chaos. From among the sundry elements came the demands for the

arrest of Chernoff and Tseretelli, for the dispersal of the Executive Committee, etc. An attempt was even

made to arrest Chernoff. Subsequently, at Kresty, I identified one of the sailors who had participated in this

attempt; he was a criminal, imprisoned at Kresty for robbery. But the bourgeois and the coalitionist press

represented this movement as a pogromist, counter−revolutionary affair, and, at the same time, as a

Bolshevist crusade, the immediate object of which was to seize the reins of Government by the use of armed

force against the Central Executive Committee.

The movement of July 3rd−5th had already disclosed with perfect clearness that a complete impotence

reigned within the ruling Soviet parties at Petrograd. The garrison was far from being all on our side. There

were still some wavering, undecided, passive elements. But if we should ignore the junkers, there were no

regiments at all which were ready to fight us in the defense of the Government or the leading Soviet parties. It

was necessary to summon troops from the front. The entire strategy of Tseretelli, Chernoff, and others on the

3rd of July resolved itself into this: to gain time in order to give Kerensky an opportunity to bring up his

loyal regiments. One deputation after another entered the hall of the Taurida Palace, which was

surrounded by armed crowds, and demanded a complete separation from the bourgeoisie, positive social

reforms, and the opening of peace negotiations.

From October to Brest−Litovsk

THE JULY DAYS 8

文档加载中……请稍候！
如果长时间未打开，您也可以点击刷新试试。

下载文档到电脑，查找使用更方便

5.9 玖币 0人已下载

立即下载 VIP免费下载

摘要：

FromOctobertoBrest-LitovskLeonTrotzkyTableofContentsFromOctobertoBrest-Litovsk........................................................................................................................1LeonTrotzky.............................................................................................

展开>> 收起<<

(ebook) Trotzky, Leon - From October to Brest-Litovsk.pdf

共48页,预览10页

还剩页未读，继续阅读

声明：本站为文档C2C交易模式，即用户上传的文档直接被用户下载，本站只是中间服务平台，本站所有文档下载所得的收益归上传人(含作者)所有。玖贝云文库仅提供信息存储空间，仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理，对上载内容本身不做任何修改或编辑。若文档所含内容侵犯了您的版权或隐私，请立即通知玖贝云文库，我们立即给予删除！

(ebook) Trotzky, Leon - From October to Brest-Litovsk

相关推荐

开通VIP享超值会员特权

作者详情

相关内容

热门标签

举报选择: