Theologico-Political Treatise P4(神学与政治专题研究4)

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A Theologico-Political Treatise

A Theologico-Political

Treatise

Part IV of IV - Chapters XVI to XX

Baruch Spinoza

A Theologico-Political Treatise

CHAPTER XVI

OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE; OF THE NATURAL AND

CIVIL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS; AND OF THE RIGHTS OF THE

SOVEREIGN POWER.

(1) Hitherto our care has been to separate philosophy from theology,

and to show the freedom of thought which such separation insures to both.

(2) It is now time to determine the limits to which such freedom of thought

and discussion may extend itself in the ideal state. (3) For the due

consideration of this question we must examine the foundations of a State,

first turning our attention to the natural rights of individuals, and

afterwards to religion and the state as a whole.

(16:4) By the right and ordinance of nature, I merely mean those

natural laws wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by

nature, so as to live and act in a given way. (5) For instance, fishes are

naturally conditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring the less;

therefore fishes enjoy the water, and the greater devour the less by

sovereign natural right. [16:1] (6) For it is certain that nature, taken in the

abstract, has sovereign right to do anything, she can; in other words, her

right is co- extensive with her power. (7) The power of nature is the power

of God, which has sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch as the

power of nature is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her individual

components, it follows that every, individual has sovereign right to do all

that he can; in other words, the rights of an individual extend to the utmost

limits of his power as it has been conditioned. (8) Now it is the sovereign

law and right of nature that each individual should endeavour to preserve

itself as it is, without regard to anything but itself ; therefore this sovereign

law and right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and act

according to its natural conditions. (9) We do not here acknowledge any

difference between mankind and other individual natural entities, nor

between men endowed with reason and those to whom reason is unknown;

nor between fools, madmen, and sane men. (10) Whatsoever an individual

does by the laws of its nature it has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it

acts as it was conditioned by nature, and cannot act otherwise. [16:2] (11)

A Theologico-Political Treatise

Wherefore among men, so long as they are considered as living under the

sway of nature, he who does not yet know reason, or who has not yet

acquired the habit of virtue, acts solely according to the laws of his desire

with as sovereign a right as he who orders his life entirely by the laws of

reason.

(16:12) That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that

reason dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also the

ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates,

or to live according to the laws of desire. (13) This is identical with the

teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous to the law - that is, so

long as men are considered of as living under the sway of nature, there is

no sin.

(16:14) The natural right of the individual man is thus determined, not

by sound reason, but by desire and power. (15) All are not naturally

conditioned so as to act according to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on

the contrary, all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the right

way of life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their life,

even if they have been well brought up, has passed away. (16)

Nevertheless, they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve

themselves as far as they can by the unaided impulses of desire. (17)

Nature has given them no other guide, and has denied them the present

power of living according to sound reason; so that they are no more bound

to live by the dictates of an enlightened mind, than a cat is bound to live

by the laws of the nature of a lion.

(16:18) Whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under the

sway of nature) thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or

impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to take

for himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or any

other means; consequently he may regard as an enemy anyone who

hinders the accomplishment of his purpose.

(16:19) It follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance

of nature, under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live,

only prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it does

not forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of the

A Theologico-Political Treatise

means suggested by desire.

(16:20) This we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the

laws of human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and

preservation; her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the

eternal order of nature, wherein man is but a speck; it is by the necessity of

this alone that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a

particular way. (21) If anything, therefore, in nature seems to us ridiculous,

absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are almost entirely

ignorant of the order and interdependence of nature as a whole, and also

because we want everything to be arranged according to the dictates of our

human reason; in reality that which reason considers evil, is not evil in

respect to the order and laws of nature as a whole, but only in respect to

the laws of our reason.

(16:22) Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to

live according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said,

they have men's true good for their object. (23) Moreover, everyone

wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this

would be quite impossible so long as everyone did everything he liked,

and reason's claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger;

there is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred, anger,

and deceit, and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. [16:3]

(24) When we reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason,

must needs live most miserably, as we clearly proved in Chap. V., we shall

plainly see that men must necessarily come to an agreement to live

together as securely and well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the

rights which naturally belong to them as individuals, and their life should

be no more conditioned by the force and desire of individuals, but by the

power and will of the whole body. (25) This end they will be unable to

attain if desire be their only guide (for by the laws of desire each man is

drawn in a different direction); they must, therefore, most firmly decree

and establish that they will be guided in everything by reason (which

nobody will dare openly to repudiate lest he should be taken for a

madman), and will restrain any desire which is injurious to a man's fellows,

that they will do to all as they would be done by, and that they will defend

A Theologico-Political Treatise

their neighbour's rights as their own.

(16:26) How such a compact as this should be entered into, how

ratified and established, we will now inquire.

(27) Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever

neglects anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of

gaining a greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does anyone

endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or gaining a

greater good. (28) That is, everyone will, of two goods, choose that which

he thinks the greatest; and, of two evils, that which he thinks the least. (29)

I say advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or the least, for it does not

necessarily follow that he judges right. (30) This law is so deeply

implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted among eternal

truths and axioms.

(16:31) As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated,

no one can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all

things [Endnote 26], and in general no one will abide by his promises,

unless under the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. (32)

An example will make the matter clearer. (33) Suppose that a robber

forces me to promise that I will give him my goods at his will and pleasure.

(34) It is plain (inasmuch as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-

extensive with my power) that if I can free myself from this robber by

stratagem, by assenting to his demands, I have the natural right to do so,

and to pretend to accept his conditions. (35) Or again, suppose I have

genuinely promised someone that for the space of twenty days I will not

taste food or any nourishment; and suppose I afterwards find that was

foolish, and cannot be kept without very great injury to myself; as I am

bound by natural law and right to choose the least of two evils, I have

complete right to break my compact, and act as if my promise had never

been uttered. (36) I say that I should have perfect natural right to do so,

whether I was actuated by true and evident reason, or whether I was

actuated by mere opinion in thinking I had promised rashly; whether my

reasons were true or false, I should be in fear of a greater evil, which, by

the ordinance of nature, I should strive to avoid by every means in my

power.

A Theologico-Political Treatise

(16:37) We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid

by its utility, without which it becomes null and void. (38) It is, therefore,

foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with us for ever, unless we also

endeavour that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for

the violator more harm than good. (39) This consideration should have

very great weight in forming a state. (40) However, if all men could be

easily led by reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most

useful for a state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit,

for everyone would keep most religiously to their compact in their desire

for the chief good, namely, the shield and buckler of the commonwealth.

(41) However, it is far from being the case that all men can always be

easily led by reason alone; everyone is drawn away by his pleasure, while

avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and the like so engross the mind that,

reason has no place therein. (42) Hence, though men make - promises with

all the appearances of good faith, and agree that they will keep to their

engagement, no one can absolutely rely on another man's promise unless

there is something behind it. (43) Everyone has by nature a right to act

deceitfully. and to break his compacts, unless he be restrained by the hope

of some greater good, or the fear of some greater evil.

(16:44) However, as we have shown that the natural right of the

individual is only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring,

either willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another,

he in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and further, that

the Sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign power,

wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the

universally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he will retain

only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his will; otherwise

he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger than he will be

bound unwillingly to obey him.

(16:45) In this manner a society can be formed without any violation

of natural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept - that is, if

each individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the

latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is, it

will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone will be bound to

A Theologico-Political Treatise

obey, under pain of the severest punishment. (46) A body politic of this

kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which

wields all its power as a whole. (47) The sovereign power is not restrained

by any laws, but everyone is bound to obey it in all things; such is the state

of things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed over to it all

their power of self-defence, or in other words, all their right. (48) For if

they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they ought to have

taken precautions for its defence and preservation; as they have not done

so, and indeed could not have done so without dividing and consequently

ruining the state, they placed themselves absolutely at the mercy of the

sovereign power; and, therefore, having acted (as we have shown) as

reason and necessity demanded, they are obliged to fulfil the commands of

the sovereign power, however absurd these may be, else they will be

public enemies, and will act against reason, which urges the preservation

of the state as a primary duty. (49) For reason bids us choose the least of

two evils.

(16:50) Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the

dominion and will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light

heart: for we have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of

imposing their will, so long as they have the full power to enforce it: if

such power be lost their right to command is lost also, or lapses to those

who have assumed it and can keep it. (51) Thus it is very rare for

sovereigns to impose thoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound

to consult their own interests, and retain their power by consulting the

public good and acting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says,

"violenta imperia nemo continuit diu." (52) No one can long retain a

tyrant's sway.

(16:53) In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared:

for it is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be a

large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the basis

and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and to bring

men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that they may live in

peace and harmony: if this basis be removed the whole fabric falls to ruin.

(16:54) Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty

A Theologico-Political Treatise

of subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no

right save that which it sanctions.

[16:4] (55) It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into

slaves: for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this

idea is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away

by his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act

accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent under the entire

guidance of reason.

(16:56) Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a

certain sense, but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all depends

on the object of the action. (57) If the object of the action be the good of

the state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does

himself no good: but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole

people, and not that of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the

sovereign power does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but a

subject. (58) Therefore, that state is the freest whose laws are founded on

sound reason, so that every member of it may, if he will, be free [Endnote

27]; that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason.

(16:59) Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of

their parents, are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look

generally to the children's benefit.

(60) We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a

slave, a son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. (61) A

slave is one who is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are

given solely in the master's interest: a son is one who obeys his father's

orders, given in his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the

sovereign power, given for the common interest, wherein he is included.

(16:62) I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a

democracy: I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it to be of all

forms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with

individual liberty. (63) In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely

that he has no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to the majority

of a society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain as they were in the

state of nature, equals.

A Theologico-Political Treatise

(16:64) This is the only form of government which I have treated of at

length, for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of

freedom in a state.

(65) I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of

government, for we may gather from what has been said whence their

right arises without going into its origin. (66) The possessor of sovereign

power, whether he be one, or many, or the whole body politic, has the

sovereign right of imposing any commands he pleases: and he who has

either voluntarily, or under compulsion, transferred the right to defend him

to another, has, in so doing, renounced his natural right and is therefore

bound to obey, in all things, the commands of the sovereign power; and

will be bound so to do so long as the king, or nobles, or the people

preserve the sovereign power which formed the basis of the original

transfer. (67) I need add no more.

[16:5] (68) The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed, we

shall readily be able to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and

injustice, with their relations to the state; and also to determine what

constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason.

(16:69) By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man

possesses to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the

sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority: for when a man has

transferred to another his right of living as he likes, which was only

limited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty and power of self-

defence, he is bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust to him

entirely for his defence. (70) Wrong takes place when a citizen, or subject,

is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in contradiction to the

authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign power.

(16:71) Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community: nor

can it ever accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the

right to do what he likes. (72) It can only arise, therefore, between private

persons, who are bound by law and right not to injure one another. (73)

Justice consists in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due:

injustice consists in depriving a man, under the pretence of legality, of

what the laws, rightly interpreted, would allow him. (74) These last are

A Theologico-Political Treatise

also called equity and iniquity, because those who administer the laws are

bound to show no respect of persons, but to account all men equal, and to

defend every man's right equally, neither envying the rich nor despising

the poor.

[16:6](75) The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of

avoiding war, or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each other

no hurt, but on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises, each

retaining his independence. (76) Such a covenant is valid so long as its

basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one enters into an engagement,

or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope of some

accruing good, or the fear of some evil: if this basis be removed the

compact thereby becomes void: this has been abundantly shown by

experience. (77) For although different states make treaties not to harm

one another, they always take every possible precaution against such

treaties being broken by the stronger party, and do not rely on the compact,

unless there is a sufficiently obvious object and advantage to both parties

in observing it. (78) Otherwise they would fear a breach of faith, nor

would there be any wrong done thereby: for who in his proper senses, and

aware of the right of the sovereign power, would trust in the promises of

one who has the will and the power to do what he likes, and who aims

solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion? (79) Moreover, if we

consult loyalty and religion, we shall see that no one in possession of

power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of his dominion; for he

cannot keep such promises without breaking the engagement he made with

his subjects, by which both he and they are most solemnly bound. (80) An

enemy is one who lives apart from the state, and does not recognize its

authority either as a subject or as an ally. It is not hatred which makes a

man an enemy, but the rights of the state. (81) The rights of the state are

the same in regard to him who does not recognize by any compact the

state authority, as they are against him who has done the state an injury: it

has the right to force him as best it can, either to submit, or to contract an

alliance.

[16:7] (82) Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by

compact, either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the

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ATheologico-PoliticalTreatise1ATheologico-PoliticalTreatisePartIVofIV-ChaptersXVItoXXBaruchSpinozaATheologico-PoliticalTreatise2CHAPTERXVIOFTHEFOUNDATIONSOFASTATE;OFTHENATURALANDCIVILRIGHTSOFINDIVIDUALS;ANDOFTHERIGHTSOFTHESOVEREIGNPOWER.(1)Hithertoourcarehasbeentoseparatephilosophyfromtheology,andto...

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