Purves (John) History of Okinawa

jmpurves@niraikanai.wwma.net

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By

John Michael Purves

jmpurves@niraikanai.wwma.net

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Island of Military Bases: A Contemporary Political and Economic History of Okinawa

An electronic book (e-book)

Cover Artwork "Sokoku Fukki no e" by S. Tamanaha, Fukki Mondai Kenkyu, Vol. 1, 1968.

The Island of Military Bases: A Contemporary Political and Economic History of Okinawa e-book is

distributed as a public information resource. Permission is granted for individual and/or classroom

use and reproduction on condition the author's intellectual property rights to the original materials

are respected. In the case that quotes from sections are intended for publication the express written

permission of the author must be obtained. In this regard, e-mail is acceptable and perhaps most

convenient. A copy of the published article should be sent to the author at the postal address below.

In terms of organizing footnotes and/or bibliographical references for this 'e-book' please follow

whatever stylistic conventions exist in your area of origin.

Island of Military Bases: A Contemporary Political and Economic History of Okinawa is founded on the

thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in

International Relations at the International University of Japan, Niigata Prefecture, on 15th May,

1995, and on preliminary research as a doctoral candidate at the Graduate School of International

Development, Nagoya University, in 1996. The Introduction, Chapter Two, Chapter Three, and

Conclusion are presented essentially as was in the original MA thesis text. Chapter Four was

researched and written at the same time as other sections but not included in the final submitted text.

Chapter One was written during 1996. This current text has previously only been available in online

form through The Contemporary Okinawa Website (niraikanai.wwma.net/index.html) the author

established in 1995 and continues to maintain. Please feel free to send observations, criticisms, or

whatever, regarding this e-book to the author at: jmpurves@niraikanai.wwma.net

John Michael Purves - 13th February, 2001

Yoshinaga Heights Apt #202, Aza-Kin 742

Kin-Cho, Kunigami-Gun, Okinawa-Ken

904-1201 Japan

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 4

CHAPTER I: From the Sanzan Era to the Pacific War

I-1 Geography and Climate 6

I-2 The Evolution of Okinawan National Self-Identity 7

I-3-1 The First Period: “From Obscurity to ‘Discovery’” 11

I-3-2 The Second Period: ‘An Economy of Transit’ 18

I-3-3 The Third Period: ‘One Nation, Two Masters’ 23

I-3-4 The Fourth Period: ‘The Ryukyus Consumed’ 32

CHAPTER II: The Evolution of the Japan-US Security Alliance System

II-1 The Evolution of the Security Alliance System 50

II-2 Transforming Okinawa into the "Keystone of the Pacific" 58

II-3 Mutual Cooperation and Security 60

II-4 The Vietnam War and Okinawa's Bases 65

II-5 The Reversion of Okinawa to Japan 68

II-6 Okinawa's Bases in the Post-Reversion Era 74

II-7 Post-Cold War Okinawa 83

CHAPTER III: Postwar Okinawan Politics and the Military Base Factor

III-1 Okinawan 'Political Culture' 87

III-2 Early Postwar Okinawan Politics 89

III-3 Post-Peace Treaty Okinawan Politics 93

III-4 The Rise and Rise of the Reversion Movement 105

III-5 The Reversion of Okinawa to Japan 115

III-6 Okinawan Political Movements in the Post-Reversion Era 122

III-7 Patterns of Resistance and Accommodation 124

CHAPTER III: The Postwar Okinawan Economy

IV-1 The Economy of Scarcity 132

IV-2 The Postwar Okinawan Economy 133

IV-3 Convergence and Divergence 138

IV-4 Economic Progress and the Shift to Long-Term Planning 146

IV-5 High Economic Growth: The Third "Golden Age" of the Ryûkyûs? 154

IV-6 The 'Reversion Shock:' Anxieties and Realities 159

IV-7 The Promotion and Development of the Okinawan Economy 162

IV-8 Post-Cold War Okinawa: The Prospects for Economic Self-Reliance 168

CONCLUSION 176

BIBLIOGRAPHY 187

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INTRODUCTION

“Okinawa: Island of Bases”

On 27th February, 1995, the United States Department of Defence once more reaffirmed

the importance of maintaining a strong military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. This policy

announcement went contrary to reports published in 1990 and 1992 which suggested that it was

planning to continue substantially reducing its troop deployment in the region in line with the

collapse of the Soviet Union and with defence budget cuts. Between 1990 and 1994 the number of

US military personnel in the region had been cutback from 135,000 to 100,000. According to the

Department of Defence's US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, "Post-Cold War

reductions have been accomplished; no further changes in war fighting capability are currently

planned; the United States will maintain a force structure requiring approximately 100,000

personnel in Asia." Most of these forces, some 89% will continue to be deployed at US military bases

in South Korea (37%), Guam (7%), and Japan (45%). The Defence Department also stressed that of

all of the United States' military commitments in the region the security alliance with Japan is the

"linchpin of US security policy in Asia." It relies on access to Japanese bases and Japanese support for

US operations. Japanese "support" for a continued US presence in the region is not merely moral.

Japan provides the US with whatever land and facilities its forces require undertaking their

designated duties, and continues to donate a hefty financial contribution each year towards the

operating costs of those facilities. Japan is "by far the most generous host-nation," and its financial

support makes it "less expensive to the American taxpayer to maintain...[its]...forces forward-

deployed than in the United States." Thus, the military status quo in Japan will persist into the 21st

century.

Whilst this renewed commitment on the part of the US to remain a "Pacific power" was

warmly welcomed by the Japanese Government, this reaction was not necessarily mirrored in

Okinawa Prefecture, where many people had been hoping for a reduction in the American military

presence rather than a continuation at the same level. There is a marked disparity in the extent of

military base and troop deployment on the Japanese mainland and its southernmost prefecture. The

entire land area of Okinawa Prefecture constitutes only 0.6% of Japan's total land area (roughly the

same relationship in size as that of Rhode Island and California). Within that tiny portion of the

Japanese Archipelago, however, 75% of all the American military installations in the exclusive use of

the United States forces in Japan and 61.5% of all troops are located. Furthermore these bases are not

distributed throughout the Prefecture, instead they claim 20% of the land on the main island of

Okinawa (including Iejima), most of which was prime arable land. This disparity could then lead one

to conclude that it is in fact Okinawa, rather than Japan as a whole, that is the "linchpin" of US

security policy in Asia. It may have been the case that there was a reasonable balance in terms of

troop deployment and base facility levels between the Japanese mainland and Okinawa at an earlier

stage in the evolution of the Japan-US security alliance, but this is clearly not the case now.

Although Okinawa Prefecture was returned to Japanese control on 15th May, 1972, after 27

years of American military occupation, and although the Cold War officially became a part of

twentieth century history in 1989, there has been no substantial restructuring and reduction of the

American presence in the islands. A 25% decrease in the overall American military presence in the

Asia-Pacific region between 1990 and 1994 has not affected Okinawa's bases. Over the last 15 years

there has been only a 7% reduction in the number of troops deployed in Okinawa and a 5% increase

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in the number deployed on the Japanese main islands. These changes are routine and consistent with

a "flexible" US security strategy in which small numbers of troops have their duties and stations

rotated. As such, they represent no fundamental shift in policy. The Governments of both Japan and

the United States are content to leave the current system intact. Given that security policy remains

exclusively under national government sovereignty and that Okinawa Prefecture is only one of 47

"local" or provincial districts, the Prefectural Government and the local population have great

difficulty in influencing the current status quo.

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CHAPTER I

Okinawa’s History from the “Sanzan”

Era to the Pacific War

I-1. Geography and Climate

Okinawa is the largest island in the Ryukyu Archipelago: a chain of more than 160 islands

which stretch the approximately 1300 kilometres between the southernmost tip of Kyushu (Japan) and

Taiwan (The Republic of China).1 Okinawa Island has a total land area of 1,199 square kilometres.

Okinawa is also the name given to the fourth smallest administrative unit, or prefecture, of the forty-

seven that constitute the modern Japanese State.2 Okinawa Prefecture was established in 1879, and

consists of some 70 of the Ryukyu Islands furthest from Kyushu. The remaining islands in the chain

became part of Kagoshima Prefecture in the same year.

Okinawa Prefecture may further be broken down into the three geographically dispersed island

groups of Yaeyama, Miyako and Okinawa. The Yaeyama Island group, which includes Ishigaki,

Yonaguni, Iriomote, and the Daioyu or Senkaku Islands,3 lies furthest from Japan. Yonaguni Island is

510 km from Naha City. The Miyako Island group, which includes Shimoji, Tarama and Irabu, is

located between the Yaeyama and Okinawa Island groups. Miyako Island is just less than 300 km from

Naha City. The Okinawa Island group is itself geographically dispersed. Whilst the islands of Ie, Kume,

Tokashiki and Iheya fall within 100 km of Naha, the southernmost of the Daito Islands is more than

350 km from the prefecture’s capital city. With a land area of less than 2,250 square kilometres,4

Okinawa Prefecture comprises just 0.6% of Japan’s total land area. In 1995, the total population of

Okinawa Prefecture, spread over 10 cities, 16 towns, and 53 villages, was 1,274,000.5 Of this figure,

more than 85% is concentrated on the main island of Okinawa.

The capital of Okinawa and seat of the prefectural government is Naha City. It is

geographically distant from large neighbouring cities, except for Fukuoka (861 km), Taipei (630 km),

and Shanghai (820 km). Naha is actually closer to Manila (1,480 km), Hong Kong (1,440 km), and

Seoul (1,260 km), than it is to the administrative capital of Japan, Tokyo (1,554 km). Geographically,

1 This archipelago is most commonly referred to as the Nansei Shoto, or ‘Southwestern Islands’ in Japan. Although both

Ryukyu and Nansei describe the same set of islands, they differ in terms of political connotation. The word Ryukyu is of

Chinese origin (derived from ‘Liu Ch’iu’), and has therefore been used far more sparingly since Japanese control over the

islands was established during the latter part of the 19th century. One can look upon this trend in naming as an integral

part of the process of assimilating the islands into Japan. Interestingly, when the US seized control of Okinawa after

victory in the Pacific War and decided to separate the islands from ‘Japan proper’, the term Ryukyu was used extensively.

At this point, obviously, it was in America’s best interests to play up the fact that Okinawa had not always been an

integral part of Japan.

2 The three smaller administrative areas are Kagawa Prefecture (1,883 km sq.), Osaka Metropolitan District (1,869 km

sq.), and Tokyo Capital District (2,166 km sq.).

3 The latter being the subject of a sovereignty dispute between Japan, China, and Taiwan

4 In terms of total land area Okinawa Prefecture is only marginally smaller than the Autonomous Region of the Azores

(2,333 square kilometres), but has in excess of five times the Azorean population. Okinawa Prefecture and the Azores are

both small island groups geographically distant from the main body politic (Japan and Portugal, respectively), though in

the case of the Azores this condition is more pronounced.

5 Okinawa Promotion and Development Finance Corporation Survey Department, Okinawa Keizai Deitabukku

(Databook on the Okinawan Economy), Okinawa Promotion and Development Finance Corporation Survey Department,

Naha, October, 1996, p. 1.

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Okinawa is located at a crossroads between Japan, Taiwan, and China. Whilst this proximity has

afforded Okinawa many opportunities for trade, commerce and cultural exchange with its Asian

neighbors throughout periods of its earlier history, however, it is also the case that Okinawa occupies a

key geo-strategic position in the region. This latter condition has been of most importance in

Okinawa’s recent history.

Okinawa falls well within the Temperate Zone, but the climate, influenced by the surrounding

ocean, monsoons, typhoons, and the ‘Kuroshio’, is subtropical and humid.6 Although located at

roughly the same latitude as Libya and the Bahamas, Okinawa is climatically closer to Hong Kong.

Warm temperatures and frequent rainfall combine to keep the islands green throughout the year.

Average longevity for both males and females in Okinawa Prefecture has for many years been higher

than in any other region of Japan, and local people cite Okinawa’s climate and traditionally healthy diet

as important contributing factors.7 Typhoons strike Okinawa regularly during the summer and early

autumn. Whilst they tend to be a good deal less ferocious these days than some remember, they can still

disable both internal and external transport networks. Major crops include sugar cane, pineapples,

sweet potatoes, vegetables and flowers.

Up until 1945, Okinawa’s economy was principally founded on agriculture, with

approximately three-quarters of the population dependent on farming. Over the last 50 years,

however, this structure has drastically changed. In 1991, primary industry accounted for less than

10% of overall industrial employment and contributed to just less than 3% of the total Gross

Prefectural Product (GPP).8 The vast majority of the workforce, more than 70%, is employed in the

tertiary sector. This heavy imbalance towards tertiary sector employment stands in stark contrast to

secondary industry employment. Whilst the construction industry may account for some 13.7% of

the workforce as of 1993, only 6.5% are engaged in manufacturing. This figure constitutes just over

one-quarter of the national Japanese average.9

I-2. The Evolution of Okinawan National Self-Identity

Although research continues to bring forth new and important information, there remains

not even a trace of doubt that the people of contemporary Okinawa and Japan proper (naichi),

including the Ainu,10 share a common ethnological origin. They are most definitely not identical in

6 The Kuroshio, or Black Current, is the largest ocean current in the seas of Japan. A warm current, originating in an area

just East of the Philippines, it flows northwards between Taiwan and Ishigaki Island into the East China Sea. After

passing through the Ryukyu Archipelago between Amami Oshima and Tokara it splits into two currents just south of

Kyushu.

7 Another being the mellow disposition of the local people. Recent studies have indicated, however, that other prefectures

in Japan are gradually catching up with Okinawa in terms of longevity. One of the principle reasons is that Okinawans

are taking less care in their eating habits nowadays. Terunobu Tamamori and John C. James, A Minute Guide to

Okinawa: Society and Economy, Bank of the Ryukyus International Foundation, Naha, 1995, p. 64.

8 Ibid. p. 14.

9 Which stood at 23.7% in 1993. Ibid. p. 15.

10 The term Ainu, which means literally ‘human’, refers to an indigenous people of Hokkaido (and nearby islands).

Unlike the Ryukyuans, the Japanese Government officially recognises the Ainu as a distinct ethnic group. In 1878, ten

years after the annexation of Hokkaido and its incorporation into the Japanese Empire, the Ainu were reclassified as

‘former indigenous people’. The numbers of 'pure' Ainu have decreased over the last century through intermarriage with

Japanese, and in contemporary Japan there are perhaps only as many as 25,000 people who insist on full identification.

There are a vast number of books and articles about the Ainu. For a concise general overview see, for example, Richard

Siddle, “Ainu: Japan’s Indigenous People”, in Michael Weiner (Ed), Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity,

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terms of racial stock,11 but share too many commonalties to be considered anything other than part

of the same cultural organization that will henceforth be defined as Japanese civilization.12 Simply put,

the common objective elements that bind them together13 are far more numerous than those which

differentiate them from one another.

That said, civilizations are not culturally homogeneous entities. Indeed, they are vastly

different in size and characterized by varying degrees of internal diversity. One need only look at the

popularly held view that there exists a Western civilization,14 and at the huge array of nations and

states contained within it, to realize how heterogeneous, and often disharmonious, a civilization can

be. Japan may perhaps be unique in that its civilizational and state territorial boundary are one and

the same, making it one of the smaller and least diverse civilizational entities, but it is nonetheless

heterogeneous.15 Aside from an overall majority within the Japanese population, there are several

Routledge, London, 1997, pp. 17-49.

11 Although space limitations prevent a comprehensive discussion of this theme within these pages, the overwhelming

body of evidence supports the assertion that Okinawans and mainland Japanese (including the Ainu) share a common

Mongoloid parentage. This was the result of several waves of both Southern and Northern Mongoloid migration into

Japan (primarily through the Korean Peninsula) from about the 1st millennium BC Both contemporary Okinawans and

the Ainu, who inhabit the Southernmost and Northernmost, respectively, peripheries of Japan, retain more of the earlier

Southern Mongoloid characteristics than do their mainland Japanese compatriots. The logical explanation for this is that

later, predominantly Northern Mongoloid, migrants into Kyushu and Southern Honshu effectively pushed the earlier

settlers further afield in search of lands to occupy. For a more scientific discussion of these anthropological themes one

should consult: Suda Akiyoshi, "The Physical Anthropology of the Ryukyuans”, Minzokugaku Kenkyu (The Japanese

Journal of Ethnology), Vol. 15, No 2, 1950, Marshall T. Newman & L Eng. Ransom, “The Ryukyu People: A Biological

Appraisal”, American Journal of Physical Anthropology, Vol. 15, No 2, 1947, Matsui Takeshi, “Research on the Ryukyus:

Progress and Problems”, Current Anthropology, Vol. 28, No 4, August/October, 1987, Yanagita Kunio, Yanagita Kunio

Zenshu (The Collected Writings of Yanagita Kunio), Volume 1, Chikuma Shobo, Tokyo, 1962, and, Hanihara Kazuro,

“The Origin of the Japanese in Relation to Other Ethnic Groups in East Asia”, in Richard Pearson (Ed), Windows on the

Japanese Past: Studies in Archaeology and Prehistory, Centre for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 1986.

12 The term civilisation may be rendered in two ways. One the one hand, it relates to, as Immanuel Wallerstein most

accurately describes, “a particular concatenation of worldview, customs, structures, and culture (both material culture and

high culture) which forms some kind of historical whole and which coexists (if not always simultaneously) with other

varieties of this phenomenon”. In this relatively, though not totally, neutral sense it refers simply to a ‘cultural entity”. It

is with this precise meaning that the term is rendered in the above text. On the other hand, it has a more charged

meaning, one that denotes “processes (and their results) which have made men more ‘civil’, that is less ‘animal’-like or less

‘savage’”. Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System, Cambridge University

Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 215. In the latter sense, American challenges to China on its (claimed) negative record in the

area of human rights are, for example, civilisational in nature. The American assertion, is that civilised society no longer

tolerates such abuses. Furthermore, America claims to be representing the whole of ‘Western’ civilisation when making

such challenges. The implication is that both America specifically, but ‘Western’ civilisation generally, is superior to

Chinese civilisation because it respects individual human rights. It goes without saying, of course, that China takes a

different position.

13 Defined by Samuel Huntington as including language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and the subjective self-

identification of the people. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilisations?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72., No. 3.,

Summer, 1993, p. 24.

14 Although Samuel Huntington was generally attacked for carving the world up into eight neat civilisational blocks;

including Western, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, African, Latin American, Confucian and Japanese, he is only one of

many to put forward the view that there is such a thing as a Western civilisation. One regularly sees references to ‘The

West’ or the ‘Cultural West’ in scholarly works across many academic areas. Whether real, or an artificial construct,

Western civilisation is certainly perceived by many as existing.

15 The total population of Japan stands currently at just under 126 million. In terms of the small percentage of citizens

within that total figure who identify themselves as somewhat different from the mainstream of Japanese society (or whom

the mainstream identifies as somewhat different) Japan may be seen as less diverse.

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main minorities.16 One may perhaps visualize these civilizational sub-groupings as moons in orbit

around a mother planet.17

As most will be aware, however, the issue of cultural diversity in modern Japan is not

straightforward. This has been a result of the friction between an actual, and a perceived or

constructed reality. Whilst the objective reality is that Japan is, and has been, heterogeneous, there

has simultaneously been in operation a central government policy of rejecting the notion of diversity

within its midst and asserting instead that the Japanese state is one single homogenous cultural entity

from Hokkaido down to the furthest tip of Okinawa. This policy was instituted with the birth of

Japan as a modern nation state in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration in 1868. It was one tool, of

many, designed to discourage the average citizen’s primary affinity with his or her region, and to

instill instead a strong sense of loyalty to the central state under the Emperor and the Constitution.18

16 In a thoroughly neutral sense, the word majority delineates the quality or state of being the greater, and minority the

quality or state of being the smaller in number of two aggregates that together form a whole. In this particular context,

however, a minority is the designation of a group which forms part of a larger embracing group or society, but which

differs from the majority (in the sense of the dominant group) in terms of certain, generally cultural characteristics (i.e.,

racial, linguistic, religious, etc.) that the dominant group holds to be of less value than its own relevant characteristics. As

a result, the minority group is often subject to differential treatment and (both positive and negative) discrimination.

17 The category and nature of Japan’s minority group differs. Whilst the Ainu are officially recognised by the Japanese

Government as an indigenous people, and therefore constitute a distinct ethnic group, this is not the case with

Okinawans. Okinawans certainly share many racial characteristics with the Ainu which are not prevalent amongst the

mainstream Japanese population, but have never made any meaningful and unified claim for similar recognition by the

government. The Burakumin are very interesting in comparison. Although racially identical with the mainstream of the

Japanese population, they are regarded as different by that same mainstream. The minoritisation of the Burakumin is

based on the fact that their ancestors worked with animal skins; a lowly regarded, if not reviled, job. Just as the

Burakumin constitute a lowly underclass, or caste, does the Emperor and Imperial Family constitute the highest class, or

caste. The mainstream of Japanese society then, regards itself first and foremost as both above the Burakumin and below

the Imperial Family. Neither the Ainu nor Okinawans are part of this equation. The situation for the present day ethnic

Chinese and Korean populations is largely identical. They are principally a product of Japanese colonial activities during

the earlier part of this century. Although born and brought up in Japan, they remain legally unable to obtain Japanese

passports or to enter many sectors of the employment market. Second- and third-generation Japanese returnees are the

family of those Japanese who emigrated out of economic necessity at the turn of the century and during the early part of

the post-Pacific War. Since the early- to mid-1980’s they have been returning to Japan in greater numbers, ironically

enough for economic reasons. Although undeniably of Japanese ancestry, they are minoritised because they have acquired

‘non-Japanese’ habits and philosophies as a result of their foreign upbringing. It is interesting to note that those of

Okinawan origin have few problems upon returning to Okinawa. If anything, they are respected. Okinawans can at least

theoretically be regarded as a distinct ethnic group. Were they, for instance, to push outright for independence from

Japan there would be few who would not find their case compelling. They have certainly been minioritised and negatively

discriminated against for largely cultural reasons this century. Okinawa was regarded as an integral part of Japan because

claiming its territory served to expand the boundaries of the empire (as was the case with Hokkaido), but its people were

never fully regarded as Japanese. Hence, Okinawa’s history of sacrifice for the greater good of Japan this century.

18 A comparable example would be the idea of a ‘creation myth’ in Plato’s famous ‘Republic’. In brief, Plato saw a society

divided up into three main sectors by occupation. Below the ruling class and guardians of the Republic were the general

workers, who constituted the largest majority. To keep them content in their (powerless) position, Plato proposed

educating them from childhood with a story, the gist of which was that all citizens of the Republic were born with certain

innate qualities. The rulers, of course, were endowed from birth with the ability to rationalise, making them the best

suited to running the affairs of the Republic. The workers, in contrast, were born without rationality, making them

suitable only for manual labour. The Japanese myth was designed to make all citizens equally subservient to the Emperor,

who in turn, of course, was only a figurehead dominated by the Meiji oligarchs. In both cases, a myth was advocated so as

to protect a ruling elite.

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Attitudes may gradually be changing as internationalization (kokusaika) takes root and Japan

becomes de facto more culturally diverse and open; largely because of the sheer number of foreigners

coming to live within its shores, and with the influence of recent trends in international economic

activity, but there still remains a strong sense of resistance to any dilution of the artificial construct

known as Japan, both from abroad or within.19 Only in the last decade has there been any

meaningful amount of investigation by domestic scholars into the nature of Japanese-ness (Nihonron)

and the construction of Japanese identity.20 This essentially academic reevaluation has had very little

practical impact, however, on the lives of those who identify themselves as amongst Japan’s

minorities.21

Whilst the people of Okinawa could perhaps be hammered into the role of a disenfranchised

minority group by those championing nationalistic movements and the liberation of the underdog,22

this would constitute too simplistic a description of the situation by far. The Okinawan condition, if

I may put it that way, is complex in the extreme. There are several dynamics in effect simultaneously.

To be sure, Okinawans are quick to assert the differences between themselves and the people of Japan

proper on occasion. Usually when they have received, or at least perceived themselves as having

received, negative discrimination. These assertions have ranged in manifestation from mild

nationalistic murmurings and the language of division23 to all-out calls for Okinawa’s total

19 One might look, for example, at the teaching of history (and other subjects) within the Japanese school system.

Textbooks are regularly ‘vetted’ by Japanese Ministry of Education committees to ensure that the information presented

reflects ‘current government thinking’.

20 Few will be unaware of the body of writing (if not general philosophy) in Japan during the latter part of the 1970’s and

throughout the 1980’s, known generically as Nihonjinron. At its core, it sought to assert that Japan’s economic success

could be attributed to the cultural uniqueness of the Japanese people. Even the occasional Japanese politician was not

averse to getting in on the act. Who could forget the claim by one individual, when faced with demands that Japan open

its market to American beef, that the average Japanese person’s intestines were fundamentally different from an

American’s. The whole phenomenon of ‘Japan-bashing’ may be seen in part as a reaction to Nihonjinron. For a discussion

of Nihonjinron see: Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, St. Martin’s, New York, 1986. For an example of the

more recent Nihonron writing one might refer to the appropriately titled “Tokushu: Nihon to wa Nanika?” (Special

Edition: What is Japan?), Sekai, No. 590, January, 1994, pp. 23-69.

21 There is a good deal of recent literature focussing on Japan’s principal minority groups: Ainu, Ethnic Koreans, Ethnic

Chinese, Okinawans, Burakamin, as well as Second- and Third-generation Japanese returnees. Most is an integral part of

the aforementioned Nihonron movement, though the area seems to be dominated by non-Japanese scholars. Although the

current writer wonders why the publishers of some of these studies seem to insist upon sensationalist titles (in the mould

of the old Nihonjinron era) when the myth of Japanese homogeneity was clearly deconstructed some time back, there is

some fine investigation to be found within. Texts of particular interest include: Michael Weiner (Ed), Japan’s Minorities:

The Illusion of Homogeneity, Routledge, London, 1997; Denoon, Hudson, McCormack & Morris-Suzuki (Ed),

Multicultural Japan: Paleolithic to Postmodern, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; and, David L. Howell,

“Ethnicity and Culture in Contemporary Japan”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 31, 1996, pp. 171-190.

22 For an interesting, if misguided, example of this type of writing see: Koji Taira, “Troubled National Identity: The

Ryukyuans/Okinawans”, in Michael Weiner (Ed), Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity, op. cit., pp. 140-177.

23 There are two common expressions in Okinawa that serve to place Okinawans and mainland Japanese on either side of

a ‘cultural’ fence. The first, Uchinanchu, is derived from the original word used by Okinawans to name their island

(Uchina = Okinawa). In its most neutral form it means nothing other than that the person referred to was born in

Okinawa or of Okinawan family. It is generally used in the context of the regular Uchinanchu festivals/celebrations held

to honour second- and third generation Okinawans brought up in South America, Hawaii, Continental USA., or beyond.

In its more politically charged manifestation, however, Uchinanchu has dual meaning. Simply put, its says both ‘We are

Okinawan’, and ‘We are not mainland Japanese’. The second expression, Yamatonchu, is derived from the name of the

Japanese people (Yamato = Japan) circa 8th century AD The political form of Uchinanchu is almost always set against the

word Yamatonchu. One can often hear scholars visiting from the Japanese mainland either apologetically or humorously

referring to themselves as Yamatonchu (Boku wa Yamatonchu desukedo...). Although the expressions are by no means

used on a daily basis by the majority of the Okinawan people, they are often used on such occasions when Okinawan

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