
Uncloneable Cryptography 3
unlike bits, which can be copied, there are aspects in which a qubit resembles a (classical) sample from a distribution,
since in both cases one copy is not enough to create two independent copies.
Proof. By denition,
|0⟩ ↦→ |0⟩⊗|0⟩(1)
|1⟩ ↦→ |1⟩⊗|1⟩(2)
|+⟩ ↦→ |+⟩ ⊗ |+⟩ =
1
2(|0⟩⊗|0⟩+|0⟩⊗|1⟩+|1⟩⊗|0⟩+|1⟩⊗|1⟩) (3)
By summing Eqs. (1) and (2), and assuming that the transformation is linear, we have
|+⟩
:
=1
√2(|
0
⟩ + |
1
⟩) ↦→ 1
√2(|
0
⟩ ⊗
|0⟩+|1⟩⊗|1⟩), which contradicts Eq. (3). □
Note that this theorem only shows that it is impossible to create two exact clones of all states given a single copy.
There are many no-cloning variants where these restrictions are relaxed. For example, Bruß et al. [
19
] discuss optimal
state dependent cloners. Here, the cloner (C) receives one of two predetermined states,
|𝛼⟩,|𝛽⟩ ∈ C𝑑
; The cloner’s goal
is to have
𝐹(𝐶(|𝛼⟩),|𝛼⟩ ⊗ |𝛼⟩) ≥ 𝑥
and
𝐹(𝐶(|𝛽⟩),|𝛽⟩ ⊗ |𝛽⟩) ≥ 𝑥
for
𝑥
as large as possible, where
𝐹
is a quantity called
the delity which measures how close two given states are. Werner [
47
] discusses an optimal
𝑁→𝑀
cloner for any
𝑀>𝑁
: the cloner receives
𝑁
copies of a Haar random state
|𝜓⟩ ∈ C𝑑
and outputs
𝑀
registers which have the highest
possible delity with
|𝜓⟩⊗𝑀
. Among other things, Werner’s result shows that
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦(𝑛)
copies of a Haar random state on
𝑛qubits would yield an exponentially small delity when trying to produce (only) one additional clone.
antum money and uncloneable signatures
The rst uncloneable primitive, and arguably the rst work in quantum cryptography, was Wiesner’s private quantum
money scheme [
48
].
1
Wiesner’s motivation was to design “money that it is physically impossible to counterfeit”. His
construction is as follows: Upon minting, the bank creates a banknote using
𝑛
qubits, where each qubit can be in one of
the 4 states
|
0
⟩,|
1
⟩,|+⟩
:
=1
√2(|
0
⟩ + |
1
⟩),|−⟩
:
=1
√2(|
0
⟩ − |
1
⟩)
. The banknote also contains a serial number. For example,
the 9th banknote could be
(|
1
⟩ ⊗ |−⟩ ⊗ |+⟩ ⊗ |−⟩ ⊗ |
0
⟩,
9
)
(here
𝑛=
5, which is too small in practice). The bank also
maintains a database, containing a classical description of the quantum state for each of the serial numbers. Money can
be veried in each of the bank branches: each bank branch needs to have a copy of the database mentioned above. To
verify the 9th banknote in the previous example, the bank would measure the rst qubit of the proclaimed state in the
0/1 basis, and reject if the outcome is not 1 (recall that the rst qubit is supposed to be
|
1
⟩
, and therefore measuring it
in the standard basis should return 1). Otherwise, it will verify the second qubit by measuring it in the +/- basis, and
rejecting if the outcome is not -. This is repeated for all the 𝑛qubits.
There are variations of this scheme that are noise-tolerant (i.e., money passes verication even if some constant
fraction of the qubits are disturbed arbitrarily). A complete analysis proving the security of Wiesner’s scheme appeared
roughly 40 years later [35,39].
Since its inception, quantum money has been improved across multiple dimensions and properties, which are
discussed in the rest of this section. Table 1contains a cell for every combination of these properties. Every such cell
contains representative constructions and the common term used for that set of properties, which might not be so
obvious: for example, a particular type of keyless quantum money is called quantum lightning. Note that in some cases,
one notion is stronger than another. For example, public quantum money, which will be discussed next, is stronger than
1The rst version of this manuscript was submitted circa 1969.