Outline: Sec. II defines terminology and introduces the
requirements for modeling the architecture of edge com-
puting systems accounting for data protection. Sec. III de-
scribes our systematic development approach and as a re-
sult the UMLsec4Edge profile. Sec. IV shows extracts from
UMLsec4Edge diagrams and discusses threats to validity. Sec.
V examines related work, while Sec. VI concludes the paper.
Additional material, including the full UMLsec4Edge profile,
complete diagrams, and further information on the systematic
approach and literature review, can be found online1.
II. REQUIREMENTS TO MODEL DATA PROTECTION IN EDGE
COMPUTING SYSTEMS
A. Data protection in edge computing systems
The term data protection refers to the protection of per-
sonal data. Regulations such as the GDPR [3] prescribe this
protection. The GDPR requires the enforcement of technical
and organizational measures to prevent so called personal
data breaches. Personal data breaches occur, e.g., whenever
an unauthorized actor accesses personal data. Any system, and
therefore also an edge computing system, which processes per-
sonal data must ensure the absence of personal data breaches.
Ensuring data protection in edge computing systems faces
new challenges compared to more established computing
paradigms like cloud computing. End devices and edge nodes
could differ in hardware configuration, preventing the imple-
mentation of uniform data protection mechanisms such as
hardware enclaves across all devices. Moreover, end devices
and edge nodes can be deployed almost anywhere. Thus, they
may not be protected by sufficient physical security measures,
so there is a threat of attackers physically compromise them.
Since the GDPR requires systems processing personal data
to ensure data protection by design, such data protection
challenges need to be considered when developing an edge
computing system, already starting with the architectural de-
sign of the system. In our previous work [4], we identified four
data-protection-related requirements on modeling languages
for modeling the architecture of edge computing system:
(R-1) Network properties: It must be possible to model
different communication types between devices in an edge
computing system as well as possible threats posed by them.
(R-2) Devices: It must be possible to model different device
types in an edge computing system as well as threats posed
by their use.
(R-3) Actors: It must be possible to model actors within an
edge computing system, as well as their trust in each other,
their relationship to data, and their data-specific roles.
(R-4) Data properties: It must be possible to model data
protection requirements specifying whether data must not be
disclosed, manipulated, or deleted.
B. Modeling edge computing architectures with UMLsec
In our previous work [4], we analyzed to what extent
UMLsec [5] supports modeling data protection requirements
1See https://git.uni-due.de/fogprotect/umlsec4edge
and threats to data protection during the design of edge
computing systems. We concluded that UMLsec provides a
reasonable basis for satisfying the identified requirements:
(R-1): UMLsec introduces stereotypes such as <<wire>>
or <<LAN>>, which can be used to assign a connection type to
a communication path between nodes in deployment diagrams.
In addition, UMLsec introduces the adversary model, which
represents the threat of unauthorized reading, insertion, and
deletion of data during data exchange over a communication
path of a certain connection type. UMLsec is limited in
having only stereotypes representing wired connection types.
In edge computing systems, however, data exchange between
nodes often takes place wirelessly. Consequently, UMLsec
only partially addresses (R-1).
(R-2): UMLsec allows assigning device types to nodes by
stereotypes like <<POS device>>. The adversary model
then allows the representation of the threat of unauthorized
physical access to these types of devices. However, there are
no stereotypes for device types common in edge computing
systems. Accordingly, the threat of unauthorized physical
access to them cannot be modeled in the adversary model. In
addition, UMLsec cannot model threats occurring when data
is exchanged between components placed on the same node.
Overall, UMLsec fulfills a part of (R-2).
(R-3): UMLsec has no stereotypes or tags to model actors
within an edge computing system as well as their trust in
each other, their relationship to the data, and their data-specific
roles. Accordingly, UMLsec does not address (R-3).
(R-4): UMLsec introduces stereotypes and tags to model
the security requirements of data during data exchange in
terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For ex-
ample, UMLsec introduces the stereotype <<secrecy>>,
which can be attached to dependencies between nodes and
components in a deployment diagram to define the security
requirement of disallowing data to be read by an attacker
during data exchange. In combination with the adversary
model (which represents the threats of data transmission over
a communication channel with a specific connection type), it
is possible to evaluate whether security objectives are met by
the system design. Thus, UMLsec addresses (R-4).
Table I summarizes the restrictions that make UMLsec not
fulfill the requirements. The table also lists the stereotypes and
tags of our UMLsec4Edge profile (presented in the following
section) leading to the fulfillment of the requirements.
III. UMLSEC4EDGE
A. Systematic Approach towards UMLsec4Edge
To create our UMLsec4Edge profile that satisfies all the
requirements, we conduct a systematic extension of UMLsec.
Since UMLsec already partially addresses (R-1) and (R-2)
in deployment diagrams, it is reasonable to extend UMLsec
with respect to deployment diagrams to fully address the
requirements. As UMLsec does not address (R-3), we extend
UMLsec with respect to class diagrams, since the data of a
system is often modeled in class diagrams. Fig. 1 shows our
systematic approach of extending UMLsec. We first create