
Ekbatani, Feng and Niazadeh: Online Matching with Cancellation Costs
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1. Introduction
Revenue management strategies play a pivotal role in driving profitability and ensuring optimal
resource utilization. One such strategy that has garnered significant attention is overbooking, a
prevalent practice in classic applications such as airline seat reservations (Rothstein,1971) and hotel
booking (Liberman and Yechiali,1978) where businesses intentionally accept more reservations or
orders than their available capacity as customers arrive. By doing so, businesses can hedge against
early commitments to low-paying customers by denying service after allocation, and also mitigate
losses from no-shows and cancellations, ultimately leading to increased revenue.
To address customer satisfaction upon service denial, one approach is to implement a buyback
contract. This contract allows the platform to reclaim any pre-allocated resource from a customer
during the allocation horizon, but only after providing full refund of the original fee along with an
additional compensation fee, often determined by a simple function of the original payment. With
the advent of modern online marketplaces, this paradigm has found intriguing applications. An
example is assigning servers to arriving jobs in cloud computing spot markets (e.g., AWS EC2 spot
instances), where the platform can recall servers after a full refund and an extra fee paid to the
owner of the revoked job.1Similarly, for negotiated yearly contracts selling banner advertisements
on popular websites (e.g., displayed ads on Microsoft Network), the platform must make online
admission and costly revocation decisions as advertisers with heterogeneous willingness-to-pay
arrive over the ad campaign horizon.2Adopting the buyback strategy enables such platforms to
effectively manage overbooking, and optimize resource allocation in dynamic market environments.
Motivated by the above paradigm, we investigate the problem of online resource allocations
with buyback. Existing work has mainly focused on single-resource scenarios (Gallego et al.,2008;
Babaioff et al.,2009), but modern applications involve richer environments with multiple resources
of different types (e.g., servers with varying computational power). The objective is to find a
matching between demand and supply. We model this as an edge-weighted online bipartite match-
ing problem, where online nodes arrive sequentially and reveal their edge-weights to the offline
side (Karp et al.,1990;Feldman et al.,2009). The decision maker must determine how to match
each arriving online node to offline nodes (with capacity constraints) either fractionally or inte-
grally. The decision maker is allowed to allocate more than the capacity to an offline node, but
should revoke the overbooked allocations by paying a buyback cost. We consider a simple linear
model where the buyback cost is a non-negative constant ftimes the pre-allocated reward.3
1For more details on this application, see AWS’s website.
2For more details on this application, see MSN’s display ad website.
3The modeling choice of the fixed linear compensation scheme is partially motivated by applications in which buyback
contracts cannot be personalized and should have simple and interpretable forms. More complicated compensation
schemes are still interesting to be studied, but are not captured by our simple model.