Giesinger_Education_Fair_Competition_D_A

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Giesinger, Johannes

Education, fair competition, and concern for the worst off

formal überarbeitete Version der Originalveröffentlichung in:

formally revised edition of the original source in:

Educational theory 61 (2011) 1, S. 41-54

Bitte verwenden Sie in der Quellenangabe folgende URN oder DOI /

Please use the following URN or DOI for reference:

urn:nbn:de:0111-opus-52554

10.25656/01:5255

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https://doi.org/10.25656/01:5255

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Johannes Giesinger

Education, Fair Competition, and Concern for the Worst Off

Abstract: In this essay, Johannes Giesinger comments on the current philosophical debate on educa-

tional justice. He observes that while authors like Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz develop a so-

called adequacy view of educational justice, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift defend an egalitarian

principle. Giesinger focuses his analysis on the main objection that is formulated, from an egalitarian

perspective, against the adequacy view: that it neglects the problem of securing fair opportunities in

the competition for social rewards. Giesinger meets this objection by expressing two basic theses:

First, he argues that Brighouse and Swift themselves fail to give an adequate account of fair competi-

tion; and, second, he shows that the adequacy view provides the theoretical resources to face this pro-

blem.

In the current philosophical debate on educational justice, there are two main answers to

the question of how education should be distributed among individuals: According to

educational egalitarians such as Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift1, only an equitable

distribution of education can be seen as just. Adherents of the so-called adequacy view call

this into question: Two such authors, Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz2m hold the view

that justice does not demand equality in education, but an education that is adequate (or

sufficient) with regard to a certain political or moral ideal.

1This essay refers mainly to following recent articles by these authors: Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift,

“Putting Educational Equality in its Place,” Education Finance and Policy 3, no. 4 (2008): 444-66;

“Educational Equality versus Educational Adequacy: A Response to Anderson and Satz,” Journal of

Applied Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2009), 117-128. See also Harry Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and Adam Swift, How Not to Be a Hyprocrite, School Choice for the

Morally Perplexed Parent (London: Routedge Falmer, 2003).

2Elizabeth Anderson has presented her view in two papers so far: “Rethinking Educational Opportunity:

Comment on Adam Swift’s How Not to be a Hypocrite,” Theory and Research in Education 2, no. 2 (2004):

99-110; and “Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective,” Ethics 117, no. 4 (2007):

595-622. An earlier version of her position is already outlined in: “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics

109, no. 1 (1999): 287-337. Debra Satz formulates a similar view in “Equality, Adequacy, and Education

for Citizenship,” Ethics 117, no. 4 (2007): 623-48; and “Equality, Adequacy, and Educational Policy,”

Education Finance and Policy 3, no. 4 (2008): 424-43. While Anderson prefers to use the term

“sufficientarian“ to characterize her position, Satz puts the concept of adequacy—taken from

contemporary debates on school reform in the United States—at the core of her deliberations. Both

Anderson and Satz use the idea of a threshold level of education to spell out their positions. This idea—

in the democratic version defended by Anderson and Satz—can be traced back to Amy Gutmann,

Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

Johannes Giesinger

Anderson and Satz use the idea of democratic (or civic) equality to define this goal; each

citizen, they claim, should receive an education adequate for him to function as an equal

within the democratic community. Thus, these authors start by outlining a political ideal

and proceed to ask how education should [42] be distributed to foster the realization of this

ideal. While egalitarians answer the distributive question without saying anything about

the aims of education, the adequacy view offers answers to both questions: how much

education and what kind of education should be provided for each child?

Obviously, an equitable distribution of education does not ensure that each person

receives an adequate education. Neither does it guarantee that schools foster the

development of desirable abilities, nor does it make sure that these abilities are developed up

to an “adequate“ level. Educational equality can always be reached by “leveling down“,that

is, by worsening the position of the better off. This insight leads some educational

egalitarians to accept the idea of (democratic) adequacy as a complementary consideration.3

The adequacy view does not simply specify the obligations of the state in the field of

education, it is also used to justify educational inequalities. Once all citizens are ensured an

adequate education, inequalities of educational resources, the quality of education

provided, and educational outcomes are seen as legitimate. In their critique of the adequacy

view, educational egalitarians point to the fact that the value of education is, in part,

positional; its absolute value for one person depends on how well educated she is relative

to other persons.4 Only if the person is better qualified than others will he or she have a real

chance of succeeding in the competition for social rewards. Thus, any educational

inequality is likely to disadvantage the worse off in the “race” for advantage. In other

words: Any educational inequality threatens the realization of the political ideal of

“equality of opportunity“. If we are determined to foster this ideal, it seems, we will have to

stipulate an equitable distribution of education.

Thus, the main egalitarian objection against the adequacy view is that it does not provide

an adequate answer to the problem of fair competition. Indeed, the democratic adequacy

account is not focused on this problem, but on the problem of social and political

integration. Nevertheless, I argue in this essay, it offers the core idea of a promising

approach to the problem of fair competition, an approach that is based on notions of self-

3See See Kenneth Strike, “Equality of Opportunity and School Finance: A Commentary on Ladd, Satz, and

Brighouse and Swift,” Education Finance and Policy 3, no. 4 (2008): 467-494; see also Brighouse and Swift,

“Educational Equality versus Educational Adequacy“.

4See Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods,“ Ethics 116, no. 3 (2006)

471-97; William Koski and Rob Reich, “When ‘Adequate’ isn‘t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational

Law and Policy and Why it Matters,” Emory Law Review 56, no. 3 (2006): 545-616; William Koski and Rob

Reich, “The State’s Obligation to Provide Education: Adequate Education or Equal Education,” (Paper

presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2008)..

Education, Fair Competition, and Concern for the Worst Off

respect and dignity. The democratic adequacy account starts from the intuitive idea failing

to give persons the opportunity [43] to qualify for positions of advantage injures their

dignity. On this basis, at least some educational inequalities must be considered to be

illegitimate. Anderson and Satz hold the view that their account leaves room for significant

educational inequalities, but this estimation might be called into question.

It must be emphasized, though, that the so-called egalitarian theories of educational

justice do not rule out any kind of educational inequality; Brighouse and Swift’s

“meritocratic“ principle of educational equality is a good example. Hence, these authors are

in need of a justification for those inequalities they see as legitimate. I comment on their

conception of educational justice, which introduces two more principles (both considered as

prior to educational equality), in the first part of this essay, while in the second part, I turn

toward the adequacy view and its connection with the idea of fair competition. In the third

part, I take a closer look at the dignity view of fair competition that is inherent to the

democratic adequacy account.

Meritocratic Equality and Fair Competition

Brighouse and Swift’s understanding of educational equality refers to the classical idea that

educational inequalities should not be due to social background: “An individual’s prospects

for educational achievement may be a function of that individual’s talent and effort, but it

should not be influenced by her social class background.“5 Brighouse and Swift do not

overlook the fact that this conception—they call it meritocratic—has some serious

shortcomings.

First, it could be said—from an egalitarian perspective—that this account is too weak,

since it stipulates the neutralization of only one source of educational inequality. Within

this conception, inequalities of natural endowment are seen as legitimate obstacles to

educational achievement.6 Additional educational resources are thus ensured for socially

disadvantaged children but not for children with innate learning disabilities. Furthermore,

this account does not demand the neutralization of all the social obstacles to educational

success; differences of personal effort, rooted in unequal motivation and ambition, do not

have to be eliminated, although they might be caused by inequalities of family background.

5Brighouse and Swift, “Putting Educational Equality in its Place,” 447.

6 Brighouse and Swift use the concept of talent in the sense of natural endowment or potential. As is well-

known, other understandings of the term are possible: Talent might be thought of as brought about by

social circumstances. But even if we adhere to a social understanding of talent, we will not deny that its

development is based on genetic preconditions that may differ from individual to individual. Thus, even

if Brighouse and Swift’s use of the term talent is rejected, it makes sense to speak of inequalities of natural

endowment (or potential).

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