Generic Properties of First Order Mean Field Games Alberto Bressanand Khai T. Nguyen

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Generic Properties of First Order
Mean Field Games
Alberto Bressan()and Khai T. Nguyen(∗∗)
()Department of Mathematics, Penn State University,
(∗∗)Department of Mathematics, North Carolina State University.
E-mails: axb62@psu.edu, khai@math.ncsu.edu.
October 27, 2022
Abstract
We consider a class of deterministic mean field games, where the state associated with
each player evolves according to an ODE which is linear w.r.t. the control. Existence,
uniqueness, and stability of solutions are studied from the point of view of generic theory.
Within a suitable topological space of dynamics and cost functionals, we prove that, for
“nearly all” mean field games (in the Baire category sense) the best reply map is single
valued for a.e. player. As a consequence, the mean field game admits a strong (not ran-
domized) solution. Examples are given of open sets of games admitting a single solution,
and other open sets admitting multiple solutions. Further examples show the existence
of an open set of MFG having a unique solution which is asymptotically stable w.r.t. the
best reply map, and another open set of MFG having a unique solution which is unstable.
We conclude with an example of a MFG with terminal constraints which does not have
any solution, not even in the mild sense with randomized strategies.
1 Introduction
This paper deals with a class of mean field games with a continuum of players, where the state
associated with each player evolves according to a controlled ODE. We study the existence,
uniqueness, and stability of solutions from the point of view of generic theory. Namely, we
seek properties of solutions that are satisfied either on some open set of MFG, or for “nearly
all” MFG in the topological sense [12, 20]; i.e., for all MFG in the intersection of countably
many open dense sets.
Let (Ω,B, µ) be a probability space. More precisely, we assume that Ω is a metric space
with Borel σ-algebra B, while µis an atomless probability measure on Ω. Without loss of
generality, throughout the following we assume Ω = [0,1] with Lebesgue measure. We regard
ξΩ as a Lagrangian variable, labelling one particular player. Accordingly, we shall denote
by t7→ x(t, ξ) a trajectory for player ξ. By selecting one trajectory x(·, ξ)∈ C[0, T ]; IRnfor
1
arXiv:2210.14643v1 [math.OC] 26 Oct 2022
each player (depending measurably on ξ), one obtains an element Xin the space
L1Ω ; C[0, T ]; IRn.(1.1)
The space (1.1) is naturally endowed with the Banach norm
kXk.
=Z sup
t[0,T ]x(t, ξ)!. (1.2)
To define a (deterministic) mean field game, for each player ξΩ we consider an optimal
control problem where the dynamics and the cost functions also depend on the cumulative
distribution Xof all other players. To express this dependence, we consider a finite number
of smooth scalar functions φ1, . . . , φN∈ C2[0, T ]×IRn, and define η(t) = (η1, . . . , ηN)(t) to
be the vector of “moments”
ηi(t) = Z
φit, x(t, ξ), i = 1, . . . , N. (1.3)
The control problem for player ξtakes the form
minimize: ZT
0
Lt, x(t), u(t), η(t)dt +ψx(T),(1.4)
subject to the dynamics
˙x(t) = ft, x(t), u(t), η(t)t[0, T ],(1.5)
and with initial datum
x(ξ, 0) = ¯x(ξ).(1.6)
Definition 1.1 In the above setting, by a strong solution to the mean field game we mean a
family of control functions t7→ u(t, ξ)IRmand corresponding trajectories t7→ x(t, ξ)IRn,
defined for ξand t[0, T ], such that the following holds.
For a.e. ξ, the control u(·, ξ)and the trajectory x(·, ξ)provide an optimal solution to the
optimal control problem (1.4)–(1.6) for player ξ, where η(t) = (η1, . . . , ηN)(t)is the vector of
moments defined at (1.3).
A mean field game thus yields a (possibly multivalued) map η7→ Φ(η) from C([0, T ]; IRN)
into itself. Namely, given η(·), for each ξΩ consider an optimal trajectory xη(·, ξ) of the
corresponding optimal control problem (1.4)–(1.6). We then set
Φ(η).
=eη= (eη1,...,eηN),eηi(t).
=Z
φit, xη(t, ξ), (1.7)
under suitable assumptions that will ensure that the integral in (1.7) is well defined. By
definition, a fixed point of this composed map
η(·)7→ xη(·, ξ) ; ξ7→ eη= Φ(η)
[moments] 7→ [optimal trajectories] 7→ [moments] (1.8)
yields a strong solution to the mean field game.
2
Remark 1.1 In general, the map Φ can be multivalued. Indeed, for some η(·), there can be
a subset VΩ with positive measure, such that each player ξVhas two or more optimal
trajectories. For this reason, a mean field game may not have a solution in the strong sense
considered in Definition 1.1. In order to achieve a general existence theorem one needs to relax
the concept of solution, allowing the possibility of randomized strategies [1, 6, 9]. This leads to
the problem of finding a fixed point of an upper semicontinuous convex-valued multifunction,
which exists by Kakutani’s theorem [10, 17].
Following the standard literature on fixed points of continuous or multivalued maps, we in-
troduce
Definition 1.2 A solution x=x(t, ξ)to the above mean field game is stable if the corre-
sponding function η∈ C0[0, T ]; IRNat (1.3) is a stable fixed point of the multifunction Φ
at (1.7). Namely, for every ε > 0there exists δ > 0such that the following holds. For every
sequence η(k)k0such that
kη(0) ηkC0< δ, η(k)Φη(k1)for all k1,(1.9)
one has kη(k)ηkC0< ε for all k1.
If, in addition, every such sequence η(k)converges to η, then we say that the solution is
asymptotically stable.
If the solution is not stable, we say that it is unstable.
Next, we say that a solution of the mean field game is structurally stable if it persists under
small perturbations of the dynamics and the cost functionals. More precisely:
Definition 1.3 We say that a solution x=x(t, ξ)to the above mean field game (1.3–(1.6) is
structurally stable (or equivalently: essential) if, given ε > 0, there exists δ > 0such that
the following holds. For any perturbations (f, L, ψ, φ,¯x)satisfying
max nkffkC2,kLLkC2,kψψkC2,kφφkC2o< δ, k¯x¯xkL< δ, (1.10)
the corresponding perturbed game has a solution x=x(t, ξ)such that
sup
t[0,T ]Zx(t, ξ)x(t, ξ) < ε. (1.11)
Throughout the following, we shall assume that the dynamics is affine w.r.t. the control vari-
able:
f(x, u, η) = f0(x, η) +
m
X
i=1
fi(x, η)ui,(1.12)
and all functions f, ψ, L have at least C2regularity.
Since our MFG at (1.3)–(1.6) is characterized by the 5-tuple of functions (f, L, ψ, φ, ¯x), we are
interested in properties which are satisfied either (i) for all games where (f, L, ψ, φ, ¯x) ranges
inside an open set (in a suitable Banach space), or (ii) for generic games, i.e., for all games
where (f, L, ψ, φ, ¯x) ranges over the intersection of countably many open dense sets. Roughly
speaking, the main results of the paper can be summarized as follows.
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(i) Given a triple (f, L, φ)∈ C3×C3×C3, for a generic pair (ψ, ¯x)∈ C3×L, the best reply
map η7→ Φ(η)in (1.8) is single valued. As a consequence, the MFG (1.3)–(1.6) admits
a strong solution.
(ii) There is an open set of mean field games with a unique solution, which is stable and
essential.
(iii) There is an open set of mean field games with a unique solution, which is unstable, and
essential.
(iv) There is an open set of mean field games with two solutions, both essential.
More precise statements of these results will be given in the following sections. The remainder
of the paper is organized as follows.
As a warm-up, in Section 2 we review the basic tools for proving generic properties. Here we
consider a family of optimal control problems where the dynamics is linear w.r.t. the control
functions. We show that, for generic dynamics f, running cost Land terminal cost ψ, for
a.e. initial datum x(0) = xthe optimal control is unique.
Section 3 provides a simple way to construct mean field games with multiple solutions. Given
an optimal control problem and a pair (x, u) (not necessarily optimal) which satisfies the
Pontryagin necessary conditions, we show the existence of a mean field game where uis the
optimal control for every player. As a consequence, for any control problem where the Pon-
tryagin equations have multiple solutions, one can construct a MFG with multiple solutions.
Under generic assumptions, all of these solutions are structurally stable.
Section 4 contains the main result of the paper. Namely, for a generic MFG of the form
(1.3)–(1.6), the best reply map η7→ Φ(η) is single valued. Hence the MFG admits a strong
solution. Here the analysis is far more delicate than in the proof of the generic uniqueness for
the optimal control problem in Section 2. Indeed, we need to show that the statement
The set of initial points x, for which the problem (1.4)–(1.6) has multiple solutions, has
measure zero
is true not just for one function η(·), but simultaneously for all functions η= (η1, . . . , ηN), in
a suitable domain.
Finally, Section 5 collects a variety of examples, where the MFG have multiple strong solutions,
Some of these are stable, in the sense of Definition 1.2, while others are unstable.
We conclude with two examples of MFG without solution. The first one is a well known case
where nonexistence is due to the fact that the best reply of each player is not unique. No
strong solution exists, but one can construct a mild solution where each player adopts a
randomized strategy. In the second example, the presence of a terminal constraint lacking a
transversality condition prevents the existence of any solution, even in the mild (randomized)
sense.
Some concluding remarks, pointing to future research directions, are given in Section 6.
Mean field games with stochastic dynamics have been introduced by Lasry and Lions [18] and
by Huang, Malham´e and Caine [16], to model the behavior of a large number of interacting
4
agents. Their solution leads to a well known system of forward-backward parabolic equations.
Solutions to first order MFG (with deterministic dynamics) can be obtained as a vanishing
viscosity limit of these parabolic PDEs, i.e., as viscosity solutions to a corresponding Hamilton-
Jacobi equation [6, 7, 8, 9]. Equivalently, one can take a Lagrangian approach, describing the
optimal control and the optimal trajectory of each single agent. This is the approach followed
in the present paper. Some examples of MFG with unique or with multiple solutions can be
found in [1]. A concept of structural stability for solutions to first order MFG was proposed
in [5].
2 Generic uniqueness for optimal control problems
Consider an optimal control problem of the form
minimize: J[u].
=ZT
0
Lx(t), u(t)dt +ψx(T),(2.1)
with dynamics which is affine in the control:
˙x(t) = fx(t), u(t)=f0(x(t)) +
m
X
i=1
fi(x(t)) ui(t), x(0) = ¯x. (2.2)
Here u(t)IRmwhile x(t)IRn. To fix ideas, we shall consider the couple (f, L) satisfying
the following assumptions.
(A1) The functions fi:IRn7→ IRn,i= 0, . . . , m, are twice continuously differentiable. More-
over the vector fields fisatisfy the sublinear growth condition
fi(x)c1|x|+ 1(2.3)
for some constant c1>0and all xIRn.
(A2) The running cost L:IRn×IRm7→ IR is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies
(L(x, u)c2|u|21,
|Lx(x, u)| `(|x|)·(1 + |u|2),(2.4)
for some constant c2>0and some continuous function `. Moreover, Lis uniformly
convex w.r.t. u. Namely, for some δL>0, the m×mmatrix of second derivatives
w.r.t. usatisfies
Luu(x, u)> δL·Imfor all x, u. (2.5)
Here Imdenotes the m×midentity matrix
Throughout the following, the open ball centered at the origin with radius ris denoted by Br=
B(0, r), while Brdenotes its closure. Under the previous assumptions, optimal controls and
optimal trajectories of the optimization problem (2.1)-(2.2) satisfy uniform a priori bounds:
5
摘要:

GenericPropertiesofFirstOrderMeanFieldGamesAlbertoBressan()andKhaiT.Nguyen()()DepartmentofMathematics,PennStateUniversity,()DepartmentofMathematics,NorthCarolinaStateUniversity.E-mails:axb62@psu.edu,khai@math.ncsu.edu.October27,2022AbstractWeconsideraclassofdeterministicmean eldgames,wherethes...

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