
the example of shocking product
j=maize
in country
d=UKR
(Ukraine), the time evolution of the available amount in a
baseline case without shock,
xi
c(t)
, and in the shocked scenario,
xi
c(t)
, next to the resulting relative loss,
RLji
dc(t)
. First (different
product, same country), this shock can reduce the amount of another product, shown here is
i=poultry
, in the same country
d
(fig. 3a)). Second (same product, different country), the shock propagates through trade relations and reduces the availability
of the same product,
j=maize
, in another country, Portugal
c=PRT
(fig. 3b)). Third and finally (different product, different
country), losses of different products, shown again for
i=poultry
, can occur in different countries, e.g.,
c=PRT
, either
through reduced production in
c
or in other countries (fig. 3c)). Note, that the onset of losses is delayed, if the shock propagates
through multiple production processes and trade (fig. 3d)). In this example it may take several years until the full production
losses after a shock have been realized via all direct and indirect shock transmission channels. Further details of both scenarios
are described in the methods section.
We characterize the network topology of those layers of the trade network that are most central to our analysis in the
supplementary information (SI) and show that Ukraine occupies a prominent position among the exporters. Here, we focus
on shocks to the agricultural production of Ukraine but the effects of shocks to a product of choice in other countries can be
explored in our interactive online data visualization30.
The role of Ukraine in the global food system We examine the losses that occur after a simultaneous shock to the production
of all food products,
F
, in Ukraine,
UKR
. The resulting losses,
RLF,i
UKR,C
, of different products,
i
, in different world regions,
C
,
are shown in fig.4. The availability of sunflower oil is substantially reduced in several world regions. The two most strongly
affected regions are located in Asia, with relative losses of
67.8%
arising in Southern and
48.8%
in Eastern Asia. Western Asia
ranks fourth with relative losses of
27.1%
. The third most affected region, Northern Africa, suffers losses of
48.3%
. The effect
on Europe is felt most intensely in the north (
38.23%
) and less so in the south (
12.5%
), west (
10.3%
) and east (
2.3%
). In the
latter case we exclude the losses occurring in Ukraine itself. However, in contrast to Asian regions, Europe and Africa are also
affected in their availability of other edible oils, such as rape seed and mustard seed oil (up to
21.1%
) or maize germ oil (up to
23.0%).
The shock in Ukraine also leads to considerable losses of maize in many world regions. Northern and Southern Europe are hit
strongest with losses of
39.1%
and
30.1%
, respectively, followed by Western Asia with
22.2%
and Northern Africa
17.1%
.
The latter also faces a relative loss of 24.7% of wheat.
Substantial losses also occur for animal products such as poultry meat. Southern Europe suffers losses of
17.2%
of poultry and
12.9%
of pork. Northern Africa loses
12.4%
and
6.6%
of the respective products. Losses reach
8.0%
(
1.3%
) of poultry (pig)
meat in central and 6.8% (7.0%) in Western Asia.
Regions differ considerably by the number of products for which they exhibit a direct or indirect dependence on Ukraine.
Southern Europe is strongly affected, with
19
out of
125
products having losses of more than
10%
, followed by Western Asia
and Northern Africa, where this is the case for 15 and 11 products, respectively. In contrast, North America and Australia are
least affected with only 5 and 7 out of 125 products with a relative loss that exceeds 1%.
In the following, we assess the role of production versus trade in the shock propagation. We compare the relative loss of
different products,
i
, after two types of shock. On the one hand, we shock a fixed product
j
in Ukraine and compute the relative
loss,
RLji
URK,C
, of other products,
i
, in different world regions,
C
. On the other hand, we shock the same products,
i
, in Ukraine
and monitor the losses for
i
in other regions, i.e. we compute
RLii
UKR,C
. The former quantifies the losses that arise on a different
layer and therefore involve the conversion of products into other products, while the latter quantifies the effect within one layer,
i.e. international trade. While a shocked country can still reexport products that it imported, we found that the share of reexports
is low in case of Ukraine and the within layer effect constitutes a good measure for trade-related losses, see also SI.
Downstream impacts of a shock to Ukrainian maize production
In fig. 5a) these production- and trade-related contributions to the relative losses are shown for a shock to the Ukrainian maize
production. Colors reflect the size of losses and each cell describes the losses of an affected product,
i
, in an affected region,
C
.
Cells are split into two parts. The left half captures the production-related losses after a shock to Ukrainian maize,
RLmaize,i
UKR,C
,
and therefore quantifies an effect across layers. The right half, on the other hand, captures the losses after a trade-related shock
in Ukraine to product iitself, RLii
UKR,C, and therefore quantifies the importance of Ukraine within one layer.
For the product maize itself both sides are equal by definition. The strongest effects of maize in Ukraine on maize in other
countries occur in Northern Europe with losses of
39.1%
, but Southern Europe (
30.1%
), Western Asia (
22.2%
) and Northern
Africa (
17.1%
) are affected as well. Note that these losses incorporate not only the lack of maize that is directly imported from
Ukraine, but also reduced domestic production due to lack of seeds and the trade with third party countries, that might also rely
on imports from Ukraine.
In addition, the upper part of fig 5shows that the shock to Ukrainian maize influences the availability of pig and poultry meat in
Europe, Northern Africa and Western Asia. For poultry meat the relative loss after a shock to maize in Ukraine amounts to
15.4%
in Southern Europe,
4.9%
in Northern Africa and
3.9%
in Western Asia. This contrasts the losses after a shock to the
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