users’ preference orderings data [5]–[7], and in social choice
theory, an important problem is how to aggregate preference
orderings in a group of people [8], with applications in the
design of voting methods and ethical AI systems [9].
Yet, only scattered results are available in the literature
on networks with preference orderings as node attributes. In
[4], opinion diffusion processes were considered and it was
concluded that the outcome of a diffusion process depends
both on the structure of the social network (e.g., directed
or undirected; cyclic or acyclic) and on the properties of
the initial preferences of each agent, for example whether
the initial preference profiles satisfy the Condorcet condition
or not. In [10] (with results refined in [11]), preference
aggregation via a form of “emphatic” voting was considered,
taking into account the connections between nodes in addition
to their opinions in the aggregation. In [12], two closely
related problems were tackled: Preference inference and group
recommendation based on partially observed ranking data.
The main idea was to utilize the underlying social network
structure under the assumption that the homophily and/or
social influence shapes the network dynamics. The proposed
models were tested empirically on several data sets, one of
which was the Flixter data set [13], consisting of a social
network of movie watchers and their ratings of movies. Based
on the ratings for each user, the relative number of movies
of each genre watched by a specific user was calculated, and
from these so-called user-genre scores, ranking data of movie
genres was constructed. However, due to the sparsity typical
of movie ratings, only partial orders could be constructed in
a this manner. Finally, in [14], two models were proposed for
capturing how preferences are distributed among nodes in a
typical social network. By sampling a small subset of represen-
tative nodes, the algorithms can harness the network structure
to effectively construct an aggregate preference of the entire
network population, and for preferences related to personal
topics (such as lifestyle choices), the proposed approach was
shown to be advantageous over traditional random polling. The
said papers also connect to the (relatively rich) literature on
preference aggregation and voting theory. However, network
aspects seem to be rarely considered in that context, and we
are only aware of [10]–[12] and [14].
2) Structural Balance: The discovery of the structural
balance theorem in 1956 [2] has spawned a large literature on
empirical analysis of real-world networks [15]–[18], analysis
of dynamic processes [19], [20], partially balanced networks
[21], and perhaps most importantly in the current context,
extensions to cases beyond the canonical signed-link +/−
setup. The most representative extensions are [22] and [23].
In [22], the edge weights can be any real number drawn from
a total ordering. A distance metric is defined such that the
negative (positive) are mapped to large (small) distances. A
triangle is then said to be structurally balanced if the three
distances involved satisfy the metric triangle inequality. In
[23], the authors considered signed digraphs and redefine
structural balance as a local node property: A node is called
structurally balanced if a ceratin subgraph related to the node
can be bipartitioned such that all directed edges within a
partition have non-negative weights, and all directed edges
between partitions have non-positive weights.
Another interesting direction of research is the generaliza-
tion of structural balance in networks with node attributes. For
example, in [24], the authors defined balance in fully signed
networks, i.e., networks where both the edges and the nodes
have signs. Such a network is then said to be balanced if
and only if it can be partitioned into clusters, within which
nodes have identical attributes and all edges are negative. The
authors provide an energy function whose minimum is taken
as a measure of partial network balance, and they also propose
an algorithm for the efficient computation of this value. In [25]
the method was further generalized to fully signed networks
in which the number of attributes for each node is arbitrary
(that is, not only +or −).
However, none of the existing literature on balance, to our
knowledge, has dealt with networks with preference orderings
as attributes.
B. Contributions
In this paper we discuss possible definitions of structural
balance in a network with preference orderings as node
attributes. The main result (Theorem 1) is that for the three-
alternative case (A, B, C) we reduce the (3!)3= 216 possible
configurations of triangles to 10 equivalence classes. These 10
classes represent the 10 different types of triangles that can
occur in a network, and based on them, a notion of balance
can be defined. We also give a general formula for the number
of equivalence classes for the n-alternative case (Theorem
2). Finally, we examine numerically the data set in [14] and
compare its empirical distribution of the equivalence classes to
a null hypothesis in which preference orderings are randomly
assigned to the nodes.
II. MAIN RESULTS
We define a preference ordering on nalternatives, n≥2,
as a permutation σon nelements. A preference triangle on
nalternatives, Pn, is then defined to be a complete graph
on 3nodes (i.e., K3), where each node is associated with a
preference ordering. We introduce a relation Rand we say
that two preference triads P1
nand P2
nare related if P1
ncan be
transformed into P2
nby relabeling its nodes and by applying
the same permutation of the elements to all nodes (which
corresponds to to relabeling the elements). This is denoted
by P1
n∼P2
n.
For example, the two preference triads depicted in Fig-
ure 2are related: In P1
3, change the node labels v1, v2, v3
to w3, w2, w1, respectively, and let elements Aand Bswap
places in all three permutations to obtain P2
3.
It is easy to see that the relation Ris an equivalence
relation: Let P1
n, P 2
nand P3
nbe preference triads. Clearly
P1
n∼P1
nsince no transformation is needed, so Ris reflexive.
Furthermore, if P1
n∼P2
n, then we can recover P1
nfrom
P2
nby reversing the swaps and undo the relabeling, so Ris
symmetric. Finally, if P1
n∼P2
nand P2
n∼P3
nwe can first