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Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27:4 (December 2000) 375–407

ian johnston

CHOOSING THE GREATER AND CHOOSING THE

LESSER: A TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE

DAQU AND XIAOQU CHAPTERS OF THE

MOZI

Introduction

The Daqu and Xiaoqu are two of the six “dialectical” chapters of the

Mozi

, accepted as being of later composition to the main work and

attributed to the aptly named “Later Mohists,” although it is not known

who these Later Mohists were, exactly when they were active, or

whether one or several hands were involved in fashioning these remark-

able chapters. Certainly they have occasioned much puzzlement among

both Chinese and Western commentators, a number of the latter ini-

tially dismissing them as incomprehensible, although it has become

increasingly apparent how crucial they are for a proper understanding

of early Chinese philosophy. What is universally agreed upon, however,

is that there are substantial textual problems, especially regarding the

Daqu. The majority of scholars, starting with Bi Yuan

whose work sig-

nalled a reawakening of interest in the

Mozi

in general, have attempted

to bring clarity to the “dialectical” chapters with detailed textual emen-

dations. Some, speciﬁcally Tan Jiefu,

Zhang Qihuang,

and A. C. Gra-

ham,

have undertaken more or less radical, but quite different,

rearrangements of the material in the Daqu and Xiaoqu. Graham,

whose modiﬁcations have been the most extensive and who has been

greatly instrumental in bringing an awareness of all six dialectical chap-

ters to Western readers, has created a hybrid text from the Xiaoqu and

parts of the Daqu which he titles “Names and Objects” and consigns

most of the remainder of the Daqu to what he titles “Expounding the

Canons.” Although the magnitude of Graham’s achievement cannot be

denied, it must be recognized that many of his textual emendations are

at odds with those of Chinese commentators, that the evidence in sup-

port of such a rearrangement is by no means compelling, and that, par-

ticularly, it has no counterpart in Chinese studies.

Quite apart from the textual issues there is the matter of the philo-

sophical context of these two chapters. Scholars generally agree that

Mozi presented a major challenge to Confucianism in its initial form

376

ian johnston

and that the continuing Ru–Mo debate was at least in part a stimulus

to Mozi’s successors to attempt to shore up their master’s original

doctrines, Mencius having by this time added his not inconsiderable

weight to the Confucian cause. It is less unanimously agreed but also

probably the case that the Later Mohists were responding to the chal-

lenge of Hui Shi and Gongsun Long who, in their individual ways, had

brought into sharp focus some of the paradoxes and uncertainties of

language and ontology. More doubtful still is the relationship of the

Later Mohists to the

Zhuangzi

, which is itself considered a work of

multiple authorship. If it is accepted that the anecdotes identifying

the historical Zhuang Zhou as a friend and intellectual sparring part-

ner of Hui Shi are reliable and that the latter preceded the Later

Mohists, then clearly one must also accept the former as doing so.

Chad Hansen for one, however, sees

Zhuangzi

as an important com-

ponent of the response to the Later Mohists.

This, and the much less

discussed relationship to Yang Zhu, must for the present remain

sub

judice.

In terms of successors, it seems highly probable that Xunzi was

posterior to, and substantially inﬂuenced by, the Later Mohists.

Indeed, in his translation of the

Xunzi

, Knoblock writes: “The Mohist

Canons contain the ﬁnal development of a logical discourse of names

and reality, which is the direct source of many of Xunzi’s ideas.”

This

would accord with the dates offered, either the relatively precise ﬁg-

ures given by Hu Shi (325–300

b.c.

or the less precise but arguably

more realistic ﬁgures given by Chung-ying Cheng (early fourth to

third century

b.c.

Turning now to philosophical content, the overall objective of the

Later Mohists could be identiﬁed as an attempt to support the basic

Mohist doctrines, that is, those formulated particularly in Books II

through IX of the

Mozi.

All the main aspects of these doctrines are at

least touched upon in the Daqu and Xiaoqu and, in each case, there is

support for the original formulations with no evidence of any signiﬁcant

doctrinal change. Two methods of defense are employed approximately

corresponding to the two chapters, the ﬁrst a speciﬁc examination of

individual points of difﬁculty and the second an ambitious attempt to

formulate a system of rules of language and inference that the Later

Mohists could deploy against the subversive Sophists and other per-

ceived threats to the main Mohist theses. An interesting issue, and one

that is so far inadequately explored, is the relationship of the Daqu and

Xiaoqu to the other components of the Mohist dialectic corpus, the

Canons and Explanations, in terms of chronology, authorship, and con-

tent. Accepting this deﬁciency, and the broad subdivision above, an

overview of the subject matter of each chapter will now be given prior

to the translation itself.

daqu and xiaoqu chapters of the

MOZI

377

The Daqu

The bulk of this most difﬁcult yet intriguing chapter, bedeviled as it is

by textual difﬁculties, is devoted to ethical matters. The main focus of

these ethical deliberations is the elaboration and reﬁnement of the

important terms,

and

their interrelationship and how to accom-

modate the natural gradations of love (to parents, offspring, etc.), the

punishment of transgressors, and the regard of the self within the con-

ceptual framework of universal love. The treatment of the ﬁrst two of

these issues in the original text is relatively facile, and that of the third is

scanty. Thus it is said that if love is universal, appropriate ﬁlial conduct

will automatically follow whilst under these circumstances no robbers

will arise.

The reality of the world is, of course, otherwise, so at an

immediate and practical level—that is until the ideal Mohist conditions

obtain—these problems must be addressed. To this end the author of

the Daqu argues that gradations of love are permissible, that robbers

may be punished and that the self may be loved, endeavoring to recon-

cile these apparent compromises with the core concepts. In particular,

the concept of

(beneﬁt) receives relatively extended treatment in the

Daqu, signiﬁcantly amplifying that given in the main work.

The issue of whether or not Mozi is a utilitarian has come under scru-

tiny in recent years, starting particularly with Ahern’s challenge to the

generally accepted view, as adumbrated by Fung Yu-lan, for example,

that Mozi was clearly and strongly utilitarian in his ethical views.

The

argument hinges primarily around the role played by the “will of

heaven” in Mozi’s ethical schema, a matter that is somewhat equivocal

in the main

Mozi.

Unfortunately, the position is not really clariﬁed in

the Daqu. First, in accepting gradations of love and beneﬁt, the ethical

position becomes agent relative which does not accord with true utilitar-

ianism. Second, however, the killing or punishment of transgressors is

clearly acceptable within the conceptual framework of act utilitarian-

ism, as is the whole idea of “weighing” acts on the basis of beneﬁt and

harm, of choosing the greater or choosing the lesser. Third, what little is

said to clarify the position regarding the “will of heaven” (section 3),

whilst inconclusive and textually contentious, does appear to downplay

its role, thus favoring a utilitarian position.

Another important component of the Daqu, which is even more frag-

mented than the ethical considerations, has to do, broadly, with episte-

mology and language. In particular, support is sought for the Mohist

objectives of consistent naming in accord with reality and reliable classi-

ﬁcation. For the latter, of course, objective criteria of sameness and dif-

ference are required, a matter that is considered, albeit somewhat

inconclusively, in sections 12 and 15. These observations should be seen

in relation to those in B1–7 of the Canons and Explanations. Despite

378

ian johnston

the clear enumeration of the types of sameness in Daqu 12, it is ac-

knowledged that errors are made (some of which are listed), and so

acknowledged, as stated in B2: “Making inferences about classes is difﬁ-

cult. The problem lies in understanding scope.” Finally, speciﬁc consid-

eration should be given to the last two sections of the Daqu. The ﬁrst of

these constitutes an important attempt to clarify what

(propositions)

are, how they are formed and elaborated, and then how they are

brought into play. It is interesting to note that this is a term not deﬁned

in the Canons and Explanations, but it is considered in the Xiaoqu (sec-

tion 1) and is of critical importance to the Later Mohists. The second

(section 17) is noteworthy for its unique structure, which comprises a

series of statements predominantly about love and beneﬁt, each illus-

trated by a more or less appropriate and often quite striking analogy.

Although the structure is of interest, the material itself adds little to the

clariﬁcation of the Later Mohist philosophical position and, again, tex-

tual problems are quite intrusive.

The Xiaoqu

The sorts of textual constraints on interpretation and analysis that

hinder clear understanding of the Daqu are much less problematic in

respect to the Xiaoqu. Despite its brevity, this short treatise, prior to any

dissection or transplantation, stands as a coherent and structured argu-

ment of singular signiﬁcance in pre-Qin philosophy. Whether one

chooses to apply the term logic to its subject matter as Hu Shi has

enthusiastically and unequivocally advocated,

or not, it is clearly about

the principles of valid inference and their application in practice, which

would unquestionably fall under the broad deﬁnition of logic. Although

some of the subject matter, particularly deﬁnitions of terms, is dealt with

in both the Canons and Explanations and the Daqu, nowhere else does

it receive such a structured and continuous presentation.

The initial section offers a statement on the nature and purposes of

bian

a term that has occasioned much debate, not least in the

endeavor to ﬁnd a suitable English equivalent. It is, however, clearly

and comprehensively deﬁned within the section itself in which the

whole program and apparatus of

bian

is set out in outline. Based on

the conﬁdence that objective truth is knowable, three theoretical aims

are identiﬁed, followed by three practical applications. It would seem

that the Later Mohist is not interested in

bian

for its own sake—that

is, the development of a system of logic—but rather for its practical

worth in resolving real issues in the quotidian world and especially in

supporting fundamental Mohist doctrines as they relate to these issues.

If one is seeking a suitable English rendering, perhaps the most appro-

daqu and xiaoqu chapters of the

MOZI

379

priate term for

bian

is dialectic in the Aristotelian sense, in which it is

contrasted with demonstration.

The second and third sections are devoted to terminology regarding

the “instruments” of

bian.

As with

bian

itself, some of these terms

have excited considerable debate, although again it could be argued that

sufﬁcient clarity is provided by the material itself, particularly when

coupled with the additional analysis and deﬁnition in the Canons and

Explanations in some instances. In the ﬁnal ﬁve sections (5 to 9) the

methods of

bian

are pressed into service to provide reasoned support

for basic Mohist doctrines. Indeed, in examining these examples one

obtains a precise statement of a signiﬁcant part of the whole raison

d’être of the Later Mohists. They must deal with linguistic difﬁculties,

particularly those raised by the Sophists, so that their thesis of names

“picking out” real entities and reﬂecting real similarities and differences

is not undermined. They must accommodate the concept of universal

love within their fundamentally utilitarian ethical position and also fur-

ther strengthen the arguments for the feasibility of the latter. They must

defend their anti-fatalist position and they must reﬁne their delibera-

tions on naming, on the scope of terms, on the part–whole relationship,

and on classiﬁcation. Again, speciﬁc aspects pertaining to these argu-

ments will be considered in the later sections.

Translation

In view of the increasing interest in the work of the Later Mohists and

the concomitant increasing recognition of the signiﬁcance of their brief

but extraordinarily rich writings among the materials of pre-Qin philos-

ophy, it seemed worthwhile to provide a full translation of these two

chapters following the “standard” text, something not hitherto available

in English. To this end, Wu Yujiang’s edition of the Mozi

has been used

as the primary source, a text that is closely followed in two other, mod-

ern editions of the

Mozi.

Almost all available texts have been con-

sulted, at least those included in the

Mo Tzu Chi-ch’eng

but particular

attention has been given to those of Sun Yirang, Tan Jiefu, and Wu

Feibai for both chapters, Zhang Qihuang for the Daqu, and Hu Shi and

Zhou Yunzhi for the Xiaoqu.

The only complete translation of both

chapters following the “standard” text that I could ﬁnd is that of Forke

into German.

A. C. Graham includes a full translation of the Xiaoqu,

rearranged and interwoven with some sections of the Daqu in his

Later

Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science

, as well as translations of some of the

other sections of the Daqu in the various works referred to in note 4.

Other, partial translations, predominantly of all or parts of the Xiaoqu

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JournalofChinesePhilosophy27:4(December2000)375–407©2000JournalofChinesePhilosophyianjohnstonCHOOSINGTHEGREATERANDCHOOSINGTHELESSER:ATRANSLATIONANDANALYSISOFTHEDAQUANDXIAOQUCHAPTERSOFTHEMOZIIntroductionTheDaquandXiaoquaretwoofthesix“dialectical”chaptersoftheMozi,acceptedasbeingoflatercompositiontoth...

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