The Categories(范畴)

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The Categories

By Aristotle

Translated by E. M. Edghill

The Categories

Section 1

Part 1

Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a

common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for

each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the

name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a

common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for

each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his

definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only.

On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have

both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A

man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named,

inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both

cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the

statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.

Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name

from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the

grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the

courageous man from the word 'courage'.

Part 2

Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter

are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former 'man',

'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.

Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never

present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is

never present in a subject.

By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are

present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said

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subject.

Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable

of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is

present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain

whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis),

yet it is never predicable of anything.

Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a

subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is

predicable of grammar.

There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject

nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual

horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the

character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there

is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point

of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.

Part 3

When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of

the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is

predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man'; it will,

therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man

is both 'man' and 'animal'.

If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are

themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' and the

genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', 'aquatic', are

differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by

the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from

another in being 'two-footed'.

But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to

prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is

predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be

differentiae also of the subject.

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Part 4

Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance,

quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection.

To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the

horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of

quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater',

fall under the category of relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum',

under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying',

'sitting', are terms indicating position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to

cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection.

No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by

the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise.

For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas

expressions which are not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white',

'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false.

Part 5

Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the

word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a

subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense

those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary

substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species.

For instance, the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the

genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore-that is to

say, the species 'man' and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary

substances.

It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the

definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For instance,

'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the

species man' is applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man' in

describing the individual; and the definition of 'man' will also be

predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and

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animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are

predicable of the individual.

With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a

subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition

is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the

definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent

the name being used. For instance, 'white' being present in a body is

predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the

definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of the body.

Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary

substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by

reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated of the

species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there were no

individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated

of the species 'man' at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in

individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was

present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus everything except

primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present

in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything

else to exist.

Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the

genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one

should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render

a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating

the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more

instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than

by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the

individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the

man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a

more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by

mentioning the genus 'plant'.

Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in

virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie every. else, and

that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them. Now

The Categories

the same relation which subsists between primary substance and

everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: for the

species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is

predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the

genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more

truly substance than the genus.

Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one

is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more

appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to which

he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same

method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, no one is

more truly substance than another; an individual man is not more truly

substance than an individual ox.

It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude

primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name

'secondary substance', for these alone of all the predicates convey a

knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the

genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall make

our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating the latter.

All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so

on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart

from primary substances, should be called substances.

Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they

underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation

that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also

between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs,

on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on

the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual

man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the species and

to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all cases.

It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never present

in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor

predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it is

clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are not

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present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated of the individual man, but is

not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual

man. In the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the individual man,

but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject,

though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present,

the definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the

name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both

the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the

individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject.

Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that

differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics 'terrestrial'

and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but not present in it.

For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be

predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance,

if the characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated of the species 'man', the

definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the predicate of

the species 'man': for 'man' is terrestrial.

The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole,

as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to

admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase

'being present in a subject', we stated' that we meant 'otherwise than as

parts in a whole'.

It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all propositions

of which they form the predicate, they are predicated univocally. For all

such propositions have for their subject either the individual or the species.

It is true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything,

it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary

substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of

the species and of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated

of the species and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the

species and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and

that of the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the predicate

will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the definition of the

differentiae will be applicable to the species and to the individuals. But it

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was stated above that the word 'univocal' was applied to those things

which had both name and definition in common. It is, therefore,

established that in every proposition, of which either substance or a

differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally.

All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of

primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit. In the

case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of 'man' or

'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also

indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true;

for a secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain

qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the

words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of more than one subject.

Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term

'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus

determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance

qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification covers a larger

field in the case of the genus that in that of the species: he who uses the

word 'animal' is herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses

the word 'man'.

Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the

contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal?

It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this

characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things,

such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the contrary of 'two cubits

long' or of 'three cubits long', or of 'ten', or of any such term. A man may

contend that 'much' is the contrary of 'little', or 'great' of 'small', but of

definite quantitative terms no contrary exists.

Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do

not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance

than another, for it has already been stated' that this is the case; but that no

single substance admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one

particular substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either than himself

at some other time or than some other man. One man cannot be more man

than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than some

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摘要：

TheCategories1TheCategoriesByAristotleTranslatedbyE.M.EdghillTheCategories2Section1Part1Thingsaresaidtobenamed'equivocally'when,thoughtheyhaveacommonname,thedefinitioncorrespondingwiththenamediffersforeach.Thus,arealmanandafigureinapicturecanbothlayclaimtothename'animal';yettheseareequivocallysoname...

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